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The international cocaine market has transformed the Caribbean Basin into the most 
violent region in the world. Against the onslaught of drugs and violence, interstate security 
cooperation and intelligence sharing are increasingly prominent features of state security 
strategies. The evolution of security cooperation has pushed cocaine flows from the 
Caribbean to Central America and the Eastern Pacific. Over time, increasing state capacity 
and cooperation has shaped cocaine trafficking and cut into the profit margins of cartel 
organizations. This thesis examines the evolution of maritime countertrafficking networks 
and argues that increased cooperation in the Insular Caribbean caused narcotraffickers to 
shift trafficking routes to regions without multilateral security mechanisms. Using naval 
strengths, interdiction data, and government estimates, we determined that security 
cooperation shaped current smuggling routes. We conclude that multilateral security 
arrangements are more effective against transnational criminal networks than unilateral 
state action. We point out the holes in the regional security network and call for a unified 
approach to transnational criminal networks. The regional hegemon has an outsized impact 
on regional security and must take steps to build and maintain multilateral relationships 
between Mexico and Central America to effectively control smuggling in the Eastern 
Pacific. 
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 1 
I. COOPERATIVE SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY; 
COMPETING MODELS OF MARITIME SECURITY 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
What is the effect of interstate cooperation on Caribbean maritime security and 
illicit maritime trafficking through Central America and the Insular Caribbean? 
Transnational Criminal Networks (TCN) transport cocaine from the Andean region 
of South America through the Caribbean and Central America to the United States. The 
bulk of this traffic relies on maritime smuggling routes through the Caribbean and the 
Eastern Pacific to transshipment points in Central America, Mexico, the Caribbean, or 
directly to the mainland United States. In the context of the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific, 
maritime security refers to the control of national sea space and coastlines. 
TCNs operate according to the “balloon effect,” wherein pressure on a route or 
production area causes smuggling organizations to shift to a different route or production 
area.1 The balloon effect is something of an academic trope and although it is often used 
to support broad arguments it is rarely examined in depth. Peter Reuter, one of the rare 
academics to tackle the balloon effect, holds that the effect is possible but tenuous and that 
shifts in cocaine flows occur in large, complex environments, making the quantification of 
the balloon effect difficult.2 For example, an increase in naval patrols in the Windward 
Passage between Cuba and Haiti may lead smugglers to attempt transshipment through the 
Dominican Republic to Puerto Rico. 
The balloon effect has become a nigh ubiquitous feature of the drug war debate as 
critics use it to denounce counter trafficking efforts. However, since trafficking began in 
earnest in the 1980s, the overall percentage of cocaine seized has continued to increase. 
                                                 
1 Marguerite Cawley, “Why Increased Interdiction Does Not Lead to Less Drug Trafficking,” Insight 
Crime, 21 May 2014, https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/why-increased-interdiction-not-lead-
less-drug-trafficking/. 
2 Peter Reuter, “The Mobility of Drug Trafficking,” in Ending the Drug Wars (London: London 
School of Economics, 2014). 33–35, http://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/reports/LSE-IDEAS-
Ending-the-Drug-Wars.pdf?from_serp=1.  
 2 
Where once interdictions sat at a mere 10 percent of all cocaine produced, now they stand 
at an impressive 40–50 percent of all cocaine produced.3 The implication is that as states 
are becoming more effective at seizing drugs, cocaine is becoming more difficult and costly 
to ship, and that the balloon effect has limits. 
Understanding the role of interdiction operations in countering maritime cocaine 
smuggling deserves special attention; the limited area in which cocaine is produced dictates 
its transportation extreme distances and through multiple transshipment points before 
reaching its primary consumer market, the United States.4 The Darien Gap, an impassable 
span of jungle separating Colombia and Panama, bars overland trafficking which requires 
the bulk of cocaine trafficked to the United States to travel by air or sea. Over the last 30 
years, trafficking routes have shifted from the insular Caribbean to the waters east and west 
of Central America. The Insular Caribbean, a network of island states stretching from 
Trinidad and Tobago to Cuba and the Bahamas, appears weaker than the states of the 
Central American isthmus. 
Economic logic would hold that control of the entire supply chain and direct 
shipment allows organizations to maximize profits. Therefore, Colombian organizations, 
even small cartelitos, maximize profits by producing, shipping, and distributing cocaine 
directly to the United States. Large shipments of product require fewer people and 
transportation assets to move a large quantity of product than numerous small units 
transporting small amounts of product. Taking a long, convoluted route also costs time and 
money. Colombian cartels able to bypass Mexican middlemen would, theoretically, 
maximize profit. Instead, distribution is a Mexican affair and transportation routes rely 
heavily on transshipment through Central America. The implication is that interdiction 
efforts have been successful in shifting cocaine flows, increasing the value-added 
component of transportation in the supply chain, and decreasing net profits for producers. 
                                                 
3 Yury Fedotov, et al. United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report, 2017; Vol 3; 
Market Analysis of Plant-Based Drugs; Opiates, Cocaine, Cannabis (New York;, United Nations 
Publications 2017), 27, https://www.unodc.org/wdr2017/field/Booklet_3_Plantbased.pdf.  
4 Yury Fedotov, et al. United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report; 2016 (New 
York, United Nations Publications 2016), 35, https://www.unodc.org/doc/wdr2016/
WORLD_DRUG_REPORT_2016_web.pdf. 
 3 
Therefore, whereas once the Pablo Escobars were the world’s richest drug dealers, they are 
now the “El Chapo” Guzmans of the drug trade. 
The Caribbean Basin consists of small, poor countries grappling with a well-
financed criminal threat. Multiple navies and coast guards must coordinate to interdict 
smugglers and prevent the establishment of routes through their territorial waters. Within 
this context, determining effective cooperative strategies and legal regimes can assist in the 
better application of regional policy. Furthermore, interdiction rates in terms of percentage 
of global cocaine production have risen as high as 68 percent. For a time, this drove purity 
adjusted costs up and reduced overall consumption.5 This thesis proposes to determine the 
efficacy of cooperative maritime security mechanisms and determine the reason that the 
relatively weak insular Caribbean is subject to less illicit trafficking than the comparatively 
strong states of Central America. In doing so, it envisions a vast, cooperative, maritime 
security network wherein the states of the Caribbean and Central America cooperate and 
share information facilitating increased counternarcotics success. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Transnational and transregional threat networks operate in nearly every nation in 
the Caribbean and cause high levels of violence in each state where they have a major 
presence. They actively seek to undermine the stability of transshipment states in order to 
maximize profits by reducing law enforcement efficacy. As a result, the Caribbean Basin 
is the deadliest region outside of Syria and Iraq with a homicide rate of 60 per 100,000 in 
Honduras, 37 per 100,000 in Guatemala, 29.8 per 100,000 in the Bahamas, and 104 per 
                                                 
5 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2016, 37; Beau Kilmer, “Uncle 
Sam’s Cocaine Nosedive: A Brief Exploration of a Dozen Hypothesis,” in After the Drug Wars; Report of 
the LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy, ed. John Collins (London, London School of 
Economics 2016), 67–68, http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/LSE-IDEAS-After-the-
Drug-Wars.pdf. 
 4 
100,000 in El Salvador as compared to 4.7 per 100,000 in the United States.6 The strength 
of the cartels is in part due to the continued success of their trafficking operations. 
Determining the best practices and most effective interdiction organizations would allow 
regional governments and interstate agencies to pressure revenue streams and limit the 
income and power of regional threat networks. 
This thesis focuses on maritime security because maritime smuggling dominates 
the transshipment process. Maritime drug smuggling allows the cartels to transport larger 
cargos at higher speeds than overland transportation and with less radar exposure than 
aerial transportation. The 1999 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
World Drug Report, wherein 5 percent of captures, in terms of number of interdictions, 
accounted for 41 percent of gross product seized indicates the importance of maritime 
transit to cocaine smuggling and the importance of proper maritime counter-smuggling 
measures.7 Ships, boats, and submarines are simply the best bulk carriers, regardless of 
cargo. 
Because of counter-smuggling actions, Cartels use semi-submersibles, go-fast 
boats, and even covert civilian traffic to carry large cargos of narcotics to the U.S. mainland 
via insular states or to Mexico via bridge countries, the Central American Republics from 
Panama to Mexico. Most maritime smuggling skirts the coastline of these countries, 
refueling in coastal islands and inlets, or lands and is converted into overland traffic. The 
states of the Insular Caribbean include the Anglo-phone Caribbean, Cuba, Haiti, the 
Dominican Republic, the Bahamas, and a variety of European and American dependencies. 
These states tend to be smaller and possess fewer resources; they also account for less of 
the total cocaine flow to the United States, approximately 13 percent.8 Direct shipment to 
                                                 
6 Homicide rates are currently unavailable for Iraq and Syria as they are active war zones. “Homicide 
Monitor,” Igrape Institute, 2017, https://homicide.igarape.org.br/; Belen Fernandez, “Getting Away With 
Murder,” Al Jazeera, 2 November 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/10/murder-rate-
mexico-161031122439604.html; “El Salvador becomes the World’s Most Deadly Country Outside a War 
Zone,” The Telegraph, 5 January 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
centralamericaandthecaribbean/elsalvador/12083903/El-Salvador-becomes-worlds-most-deadly-country-
outside-a-war-zone.html. 
7 United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, Global Illicit Drug Trends; 1999 (New York, United 
Nations Publications 2017), 47, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/report_1999-06-01_1.pdf.  
8 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report; 2016, 38. 
 5 
the United States is rare so almost all cocaine bound to the United States must be 
transshipped through these states. 
Historically, the best route to the United States has been the most direct; from 1990–
1994, an estimated 70 percent of U.S.-bound cocaine traveled through the Caribbean.9 
However, by 2011, an estimated 90 percent of U.S.-bound cocaine transited Mexico and 
Central America.10 Most cocaine destined for the U.S. market is Colombian in origin and 
a direct maritime route through the Caribbean offers higher profits by transporting large 
volumes directly to distribution and bypassing middlemen in Mexico. A direct route 
through the insular Caribbean shortens the supply chain and increases potential profit by 
delivering product to the most population dense portions of the United States. The question 
then begs itself: “Why have smugglers decided to avoid this route?” Increasing interdiction 
rates correlate to an increase in purity weighted price and a decrease in consumption (both 
total and in the United States).11 This implies that pressure on the supply chain may impact 
price and consumption. It also means that the security environment of the Caribbean must 
be less conducive to transportation than the Central American corridor. 
The two significant regional transit routes, the insular and bridge routes, operate 
under different regional security apparatuses. The Insular Caribbean operates under the 
Caribbean Community’s (CARICOM) Crime and Security Strategy (CSS), the Regional 
Security System (RSS, a security organization consisting of the micro states of the Lesser 
Antilles), and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI, a State Department-based 
capacity building initiative).12 The bridge states of Central America have CARSI, Central 
American Armed Forces Conference (CFAC), and the Central American Integration 
                                                 
9 Michael Morris, Caribbean Maritime Security (New York, St. Martin’s Press 1994), 138. 
10 Peter Chalk, The Latin American Drug Trade; Scope, Dimensions, Impact, and Response (Santa 
Monica, RAND Corporation 2011), 5–6; United Nations Office For Drug Control and Crime Prevention, 
Global Illicit Drug Trends 1999, 46. 
11 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report; 2016, 40. 
12 Marcela Donadio, Samanta Kussrow, A Comparative Atlas of Defense in Latin America and the 
Caribbean Latin American Security and Defense Network (Buenos Aires, RESDAL 2016), 87, 
http://www.resdal.org/ing/assets/atlas_2016_ing_completo.pdf; Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, 
Testimony Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, 
111th Cong. (2009) (Statement of Julissa Reynoso, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western 
Hemisphere Affairs) https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/2009/141958.htm. 
 6 
System (SICA). The contrast between narcotics traffic through these two regions indicates 
that these institutions and organizations behave in structurally different ways and that the 
insular Caribbean security mechanisms function more effectively. 
The constant presence of the United States also drives the regional security 
situation. SOUTHCOM, Joint Interagency Task Force–South (JIATF-S), Fourth Fleet, and 
the USCG (U.S. Coast Guard), represent the U.S. contribution to regional security and, 
although they operate on a relatively small budget for the United States, dwarf the strength 
of every other regional power. SOUTHCOM employs U.S. forces in the region and focuses 
on enabling regional partners. Through interstate information sharing and increased inter-
agency communication, JIATF-S has sought to increase interdiction rates and regional 
security.13 The increasing tendency of cocaine traffickers to transit over the southwestern 
land border, as opposed to a sea route, indicates the impact of the USCG. Conducting an 
academic investigation into the efficacy of these efforts can demonstrate both the value of 
regional maritime security efforts and highlight best practices. Given the relative strength 
and capability of U.S. maritime forces and their regional dominance, U.S. efforts warrant 
examination. 
There is a larger academic and political debate about the utility of interdiction and 
supply side counter-smuggling efforts. Arguments range from simply legalizing narcotics 
to developing better demand reduction strategies and policies in consumer nations.14 
However, given that interdiction efforts and supply side operations are the current methods 
of choice for combating transnational crime and drugs, this study shall largely ignore the 
demand reduction debate. Regional security mechanisms and maritime interdiction 
                                                 
13 Kurt Tidd, “2017-2027 Theater Strategy,” United States Southern Command, 
http://www.southcom.mil/Portals/7/Documents/USSOUTHCOM_Theater_Strategy_Final.pdf?ver=2017-
05-19-120652-483, 6–9. 
14 Tom Wainwright, Narconomics; How to Run A Drug Cartel (New York, NY, Public Affairs 2016); 
Peter Watt and Roberto Zepeda, “Perspectives of Decriminalization and Legalization of Illicit Drugs,” in 
Cooperation and Drug Policies in the Americas; Trends in the Twenty First Century, ed. Roberto Zepeda 
and Jonathan Rosen (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books 2015); Emily Swanson, “Here Are All the Drugs 
Americans Want to Legalize,” Huffington Post, 17 April 2014, Accessed 9June 2017, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/17/drug-legalization-poll_n_5162357.html; Lars Scholtz, “US 
Security Policy Towards Latin America; Emerging Themes, Changing Realities,” Strategy for Empire; U.S. 
Regional Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, ed. Brian Loveman (Lanham, SR Books 2004), 257–258. 
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operations in bridge and insular Caribbean states have been largely neglected by the larger 
academic literature. This thesis proposes to examine regional interdiction efforts in the 
hope of determining best practices. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Regional security, counter-narcotics, and counter-network operations all attract a 
fair amount of academic study and are related to the regional maritime security problem, 
but the specific field receives little direct attention. Regional security discussions center on 
state strength, local levels of corruption, and the capacity of local law enforcement. 
Counter-narcotics operations are generally discussed in terms of catching smugglers on dry 
land, perhaps reloading a small plane or thwarting local production. The U.S. government 
and the UNODC have examined security efficacy and smuggling for decades. These 
reports include the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) annual reports on 
Cocaine Smuggling, the UNODC’s World Drug Report, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration’s (DEA) annual intelligence report, the International Narcotics Control 
Board’s annual report (INCB, another UN organization), and the State Department’s 
annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports (INCSR). Occasionally, the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) will conduct a review of current programs and 
strategies, but these documents tend to provide the best regular assessments counter-
narcotics operations. 
The drug threat began to emerge in the 1970s and 1980s but the fundamental 
dynamics driving regional security only emerged in the 1990s with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. The literature of the 1990s focused on security cooperation among states no 
longer threatened by Soviet sponsored leftist insurgents. This created a field wherein 
Serbin, Griffin, and Morris discussed the behavior of individual states in a monopolar 
environment and considered the possibility of small state conflict. These post-Cold War 
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writers tended to promote cooperative, stability-oriented structures, and neglect counter-
network oriented treaty structures like the RSS.15  
Since the beginning of the “War on Drugs” and the emergence of powerful criminal 
organizations in South and Central America a robust literature on the drug trade has 
emerged. Most writers on the 21st century focus on the garish violence of Mexico and 
discussions of narcotics smuggling organizations have tended to focus on the gore and flash 
of that state’s persistent conflict. However, some degree of subtlety has entered the 
discussion; Bunck and Fowler address the specific plight of “bridge countries” and state-
nonstate conflict it generates. Their focus is primarily on small Central American states 
and the resilient, adaptable nature of smuggling networks.16 Lars Scholtz asserts that the 
DoD’s focus on regional security, as defined as counter-narcotics and counter-terror related 
efforts, largely result from institutional momentum.17 By asserting that the most effective 
form of counter-narcotics is demand reduction, he essentially writes off the importance of 
                                                 
15 Morris, Caribbean Maritime Security, 11–61; Ivelaw Griffith, Drugs and Security in the 
Caribbean; Sovereignty Under Siege (University Park, Pennsylvania State University, 1997); Andres 
Serbin “International Security in the Caribbean” in Regional Mechanism and International Security in 
Latin America, ed. Olga Pellicer (New York, The United Nations University Press, 1998). 
Two prominent treatments of Caribbean Maritime security issues exist: Michael Morris’s “Caribbean 
Maritime Security” and Ivelaw Griffith’s Drugs and Security in the Caribbean. However, Morris’s 
treatment was written in 1994 and Griffith’s book only contains one operational chapter and was written in 
1997. Morris states that the Caribbean states have traditionally neglected sea control and maritime security 
as it was generally guaranteed by an imperial client. This is a valid explanation for the Caribbean’s early 
trafficking dominance, but the dated nature of the material and the lone chapter dedicated to counter-
narcotics operations reduces the books relevance. Morris also provides a useful analysis of state maritime 
capacity by platform and creates a hierarchy for assessing regional capabilities. While dated, this could 
provide a useful framework for analysis if properly updated. Griffith’s multiple works have advocated 
multilateral coordination to affect total effectiveness, and a renewed focus on prosecution. His 1997 book 
and subsequent works focus on the interrelationship of “drugs, geography, power, and politics” and, while 
descriptive of programs, tended to neglect results.  
The regional security field has shifted significantly since the fall of the Soviet Union. While counter-
network operations are discussed, the starting point of post-Cold War security studies remains rooted in 
simply determining the course of regional security structures within a monopolar system. Andres Serbin 
states that the evaporation of the bipolar conflict of the Cold War left regional states without a common 
threat and reduced the importance of interstate security cooperation. His 1998 assessment held that most 
states tended to defer to hemispheric organizations like the OAS on security issues. His main critique is 
U.S. dominance of regional security debate and he essentially advocates an independent, stability focused 
agenda for the region. However, this fails to account for the fact that threat networks now constitute one of 
the primary drivers of regional instability.  
16 Julie Marie Bunck and Michael Ross Fowler, Bribes, Bullets, and Intimidation; Drug Trafficking 
and the Law in Central America. (University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press 2012), 1–13. 
17 Lars Scholtz, “US Security Policy Towards Latin America,” 257–258. 
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counter-network and interdiction operations. Similarly, Wainwright’s Narconomics studies 
narcotics smuggling and distribution in the context of capitalism and economics. Authors 
focusing on the violence of the drug trade tend to advocate for legalization claiming the 
illicit nature of narcotics causes capitalistic competition to find form in violence. The 
tendency is to forsake the drug war entirely and call for broad legalization and regulation 
of the market. This strategy, possessing theoretical merit, is political folly in all cases but 
marijuana. Cocaine, heroin, crystal methamphetamine, and other “hard” drugs lack the 
popular support that marijuana has garnered in recent decades and have too many 
associated health risks to be authorized for legal consumption. 
The academic field of counter-narcotics tends to focus on failures and impacts. The 
monopolar power of the United States draws a lot of attention; academics have tackled the 
U.S. unilateral and bilateral relationships throughout the region. These studies are mostly 
accounts of U.S.–Mexican or U.S.–Colombian efforts. Some of them focus on individual 
states as opposed to counter-narcotics networks. For example, Monica Serrano examines 
the impacts of transnational crime on governments, the effectiveness of “weak” and 
“strong” states, and the impact of regime type on counter-narcotics.18 Similarly, Lilian 
Bobea holds that the insular Caribbean suffers from institutional weakness that limits the 
consistency and efficacy of states and that these regional leaders lack real commitment to 
regional security and counternarcotic networks. This lack of local institutional strength has 
limited the effectiveness of regional efforts.19 Unilateral state studies also tend to find a 
lack of political will; Kirton and Anatol determined that state opinions are moving closer 
to the emerging academic consensus that acting independently and unilaterally is less 
effective at counter-network operations than working within a regional framework.20 In 
part, this field has emerged in the wake of security developments such as the Obama 
                                                 
18 Monica Serrano, “Transnational Crime in the Western-Hemisphere,” in The Future of Inter-
American Relations, ed. Jorge Dominguez (New York, NY: Routledge 2000), 87. 
19 Lilian Bobea, “The Dawn of Post-Hegemonic Cooperation?” in Cooperation and Drug Policies in 
the Americas; Trends in the Twenty First Century, ed. Roberto Zepeda and Jonathan Rosen (Lexington, 
MD: Lexington Books 2015) 153–154. 
20 Mark Kirton and Marlon Anatol, “Current Trends in Caribbean cooperation in the War on Drugs,” 
Cooperation and Drug Policies in the Americas; Trends in the Twenty First Century, eds. Roberto Zepeda 
and Jonathan Rosen (Lexington, MD: Lexington Books 2015), 81–97. 
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administration’s embrace of multilateralism and the creation of the CARICOM security 
apparatus. The tendency toward collective security and counternarcotics traces back 
through Serbin and the Cold War concept of collective, hemispheric defense embodied by 
the OAS. These commentaries on the efficacy of cooperative relationships neglect imperial 
measures of cooperative success and are almost all limited to simple law enforcement 
cooperation without much coverage of maritime cooperation. 
Examinations of regional institutions remain relatively rare; even Cooperation and 
Drug Policies in the Americas tends to focus on the state out approach as opposed to the 
systemic or regional, institutional approach. However, a report by Peter Meyer and Clare 
Seelke, members of the Congressional Research Service, indicates that Central America’s 
problems with transnational crime are in part due to the institutional weakness of SICA as 
a coordinating body.21 The paper is essentially a regional overview with a focus on CARSI 
spending, but the mention of this lack of regional institutional capacity belies the topic’s 
significance. Again, the maritime component of drug smuggling is only as an afterthought 
despite its clear importance to the field of counternarcotics. 
There have been several attempts to assess CARSI on a state-by-state basis. A series 
of working papers by Nicholas Phillips and Aaron Krothius indicate that CARSI has been 
less effective than possible because of the lack of regional coordination.22 “The studies 
find that CARSI does not reflect an integrated strategy for addressing the critical security 
threats in Central America and thus has had a negligible impact on the factors driving the 
                                                 
21 Peter Meyer and Carl Seelke, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy 
Issues for Congress, CRS Report No. R41731 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015), 
14, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41731.pdf.  
22 Aaron Korthuis, “The Central America Regional Security Initiative in Honduras,” (Working paper 
prepared for the Woodrow Wilson Center, September 2014), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/
files/CARSI%20in%20Honduras.pdf; Nicholas Phillips, “CARSI in Guatemala; Progress, Failure, and 
Uncertainty,” (working paper, Woodrow Wilson Center September, 2014), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/
sites/default/files/CARSI%20in%20Guatemala_1.pdf; Eric Olson, “Examining the Central America 




increased Central American migration since 2011.”23 Their work contributes to the 
emerging consensus on the necessity of close interstate coordination. 
In contrast to the emerging literature on multilateral action, some claim that U.S. 
efforts are the entirely responsible for any gains in the region. Evan Munsing and 
Christopher Lamb credit SOUTHCOM’s Joint Interagency Task Force South with the 
lion’s share of credit for regional maritime security successes. They argue that the U.S. 
interagency and international capabilities brought to bear by JIATF-S are responsible for 
an overall uptick in interdiction rates.24 Their analysis of JIATF-S precludes meaningful 
action by regional partners. 
RAND has also added to the academic assessment of the U.S. Government’s 
regional impact. A 2011 RAND Corporation report by Peter Chalk highlighted an emerging 
trend. Maritime shipping dominates drug trafficking; 80 percent of the cocaine consumed 
in the United States is transported by sea, of which 90 percent enters Mexico before shifting 
to overland transportation The study’s authors, writing for an Air Force audience, 
recommended the maintenance and improvement of ISR capabilities and further 
development of positive relations with regional host countries.25 A different RAND report 
from 2012 on maritime irregular warfare argued that capacity building in Colombia had 
increased the detection and interdiction of Self-Propelled Semi Submersibles (SPSS) and 
Go-Fasts.26 Finally, a 2013 RAND assessment of partner capacity building in 
SOUTHCOM found that the command had been largely effective and efficient in its efforts 
to build partner capacity to counter transnational crime. The report even cites the relative 
                                                 
23 Olson, “Examining the Central America Regional Security Initiative.” 
24 Evan Munsing and Christopher Lamb, Strategic Perspectives 5: Joint Interagency Task Force-
South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success (Washington, National Defense University 
Press 2011), 85, 86, https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo16331/Strategic-Perspectives-5.pdf. 
25 Peter Chalk, The Latin American Drug Trade; Scope, Dimensions, Impact, and Response, MG-
1076-AF, (Santa Monica, RAND Corp, 2017), 67–70, 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1076.html. 
26 Molly Dunigan et al., Characterizing and Exploiting the Implications of Maritime Irregular 
Warfare, MG-1127-NAVY (Santa Monica, RAND Corporation 2012), 40–44, https://www.rand.org/pubs/
monographs/MG1127.html.  
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success of attempts to develop Guatemala’s maritime interdiction capacity.27 However, 
this study was only oriented toward direct bilateral aid and neglected the necessity for a 
comprehensive approach to the region; similarly, it neglected to assess the shortcomings 
of SICA. 
Over the course of the last 20 years some academics have attempted to study the 
impact and efficacy of supply reduction strategies. Beau Kilmer notes that there was a 
decrease in the total quantity of pure cocaine imported from 2006–2010 by approximately 
50 Percent with a corresponding price hike of 40 percent.28 Kilmer assesses a number of 
other possible causal explanations for the increasing cost and reduced total supply in the 
United States.29 He generally gives credence to the possible success of supply side 
measures including a spike in interdiction.30 The data he tracks also indicates an overall 
reduction in cocaine use.31 Since Kilmer’s summary of the 2006–2010 decline in 
consumption and increase in price the UNODC has assessed a stabilization in both supply 
and interdiction.32 Similarly, Juan Castillo, Daniel Meija, and Pasucal Restrepo argue that 
interdiction efforts have been largely effective in supply reduction. However, they also 
argue that the consequence of this supply reduction has been the massive spike in cartel 
violence in Mexico.33 This emerging body of research is valuable because it demonstrates 
that interdiction efforts can affect end cost and consumption. Additionally, when coupled 
with UNODC data on an increased, but purity adjusted cost of cocaine, supply reduction 
                                                 
27 Jennifer Moroney, David Thaler, and Joe Hogler, Review of Cooperation Mechanisms Combatant 
Commands Utilize to Build Partner Capacity, RR-413-OSD, (Santa Monica, RAND Corporation 2013), 
47–48, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR413.html.  
28 Beau Kilmer, “Uncle Sam’s Cocaine Nosedive,” 67. 
29 Ibid., 75. 
30 Ibid., 65–80. 
31 This assessment is borne out by UNODC data that indicates a steady increase in interdiction as a 
percentage in overall product. Which has seen a rise from approximately 20 percent in the 1980s to up to 
68 percent in 2014. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report; 2016, 36. 
32 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report; 2016, 37. 
33 Juan Camilo Castillo, Daniel Mejia, and Pascual Restrepo, “Scarcity without Leviathan: The 
Violent Effects of Cocaine Supply Shortages in the Mexican Drug War,” (Working Paper 356 for the 
Center for Global Development, February 2014), https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/scarcity-
leviathan-effects-cocaine-supply-shortages_1.pdf. 
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can be correlated to a 34 percent reduction in cocaine related deaths and a 54 percent 
reduction in users.34 In the cases of Kilmer, Castillo, Meija, and Restrepo maritime security 
is treated as an afterthought or a component piece of supply reduction. The efficacy of 
maritime interdiction efforts in the insular Caribbean is noted by Vanda Felbab-Brown. 
She argues that interdiction is preferable to eradication, especially in unstable regions like 
Colombia.35 However, the bulk of her argument is geared toward providing novel 
interdiction practices rather than regional cooperation. These authors all note the impact 
increased interdiction rates and other supply side pressures which indicate the possible 
effectiveness of a supply side approach to the problem. 
Government and UN reports also debate the cause of the shift in cocaine trafficking 
market. The 2000 UNODC World Drug report noted the reduction of the Colombian cartels 
and the relative strength of Mexican criminal organizations as having rerouted the cocaine 
market through Mexico and the Southwestern United States, a process eased by the 
implementation of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement).36 This is a relatively 
consistent UN interpretation of the shift in narcotics trafficking; the 2009 “Cocaine from 
South America to the United States” report also claims that the rise of Mexican Cartels 
drew the trade toward Central America and Mexico.37 This follows the logic of Mexican 
dominance drawing the cocaine trade away from the Caribbean, instead of law enforcement 
efforts pushing it away from the Caribbean. 
                                                 
34 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report; 2016, 37. 
35 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Report: Improving Supply-Side Policies: Smarter Eradication, Interdiction 
and Alternative Livelihoods— and the Possibility of Licensing,” The Brookings Institute, 6 May 2014, 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/improving-supply-side-policies-smarter-eradication-interdiction-and-
alternative-livelihoods-and-the-possibility-of-licensing/. 
36 United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, World Drug Report; 2000 (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 45, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/world_drug_report_2000/report_2001-01-
22_1.pdf.  
37 “Cocaine From South America to the United States,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
accessed 10 March 2018, 31, http://www.unodc.org/documents/toc/Reports/TOCTASouthAmerica/English/
TOCTA_CACaribb_cocaine_SAmerica_US.pdf. 
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D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
There are several possible explanations for the shift in narcotics smuggling from 
the Insular Caribbean to Central America and Mexico. First, the existence of CARICOM, 
the RSS, and other Caribbean security mechanisms may allow the Caribbean states to 
operate as a unit, allowing them to better deter and interdict narcotraffickers.38 When 
properly supported by the United States these united efforts may prove resistant to 
smuggling attempts. The weakness of these states may be forcing a type of balancing in 
the face of an irregular threat. This cooperation, in turn, makes it harder to traffic narcotics 
through the region and prompts a reliance on the Central American route. If the multilateral 
nature of the RSS and the Insular Caribbean’s security relationship provides it with 
adequate cooperative strength, Central America’s continued prevalence as a transshipment 
point may be due to their lack of a similar cooperative security mechanism.39 While they 
do receive aid from the United States, a lack of true interstate cooperation may inhibit their 
effectiveness. This lack of unity may be due to their relative size, wealth, and a history of 
interstate rivalry. Because the Central American Republics are not small and weak enough, 
they may opt to act unilaterally as opposed to operating through a multilateral structure. It 
is possible that the political disunity and weakness of the area may contribute to their 
shortcomings. 
In tension with the collaborative hypothesis is also the possibility that the states of 
the Insular Caribbean simply maintain a stronger presence in their waters than the Central 
American navies and coast guards. Free from the burden of maintaining large land forces 
these small states can field larger navies and better deter smugglers. The maritime 
orientation of the state security apparatus may make maritime law enforcement easier and 
cartel reliance on maritime smuggling may dictate route selection. 
Finally, the United States deserves special consideration. As the global hegemon, 
it has clear interests in regional stability and the interdiction of cocaine bound to the U.S. 
                                                 
38 Donadio, A Comparative Atlas of Defense in Latin America and the Caribbean 2016, 72. 
39 Olson, “Examining the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI)”; Meyer and Seelke, 
“Central America Regional Security Initiative,” 14. 
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The actions of SOUTHCOM, JIATF-S, the USCG, and Fourth Fleet could deserve most 
of the credit for dissuading traffickers.40 The USCG routinely interdicts traffic in the 
maritime Caribbean, and a vigorous press in the late 1980s stemmed the flow of marijuana 
from the Caribbean. The USCG represents a relatively powerful force, and the United 
States tends to dominate in terms of interdiction rates: accounting for 15 percent of global 
seizures, second only to Colombia.41 If it is U.S. policy that has shaped regional security 
operations and efficacy, then the problem of cocaine interdiction may not be as intractable 
as it appears. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research design for this project is a comparative case study of Central American 
and Caribbean smuggling vectors, maritime security capacities, and cooperative security 
arrangements. It considers the possibility that U.S. involvement has been the driving factor 
in regional security behavior and performance. CARICOM seems to have been relatively 
effective in driving down regional smuggling rates. Conversely, SICA has overseen a rise 
in regional smuggling. The efficacy of the two systems is assessed to determine if the 
Caribbean interdicts more of cocaine’s regional flow than Central America and Mexico. 
Then each of the regional systems needs to be assessed based on a combination of 
individual and regional capability. Establishing the quantity and quality of maritime 
security assets on a state-by-state basis also occurs and allows a determination of relative 
Maritime Security Force (MSF) strength. Comparing this to interdictions allows us to 
determine if maritime security capacity drives interdictions. Updating Morris’s analytical 
framework for state maritime capacity provides qualitative assessments of relative 
strengths and categorizes state maritime assets. This is accomplished using industry 
publications and Jane’s Fighting Ships. Comparing UNODC interdiction data from 
individual states against changes in state capacity demonstrates the relative importance of 
force strength. 
                                                 
40 Munsing and Lamb, Joint Interagency Task Force-South, 85, 86. 
41 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report; 2016, 37. 
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Regions are then assessed on a state-by-state basis with special attention paid to 
developments in interstate security relationships. Studying developments in regional 
security relationships in comparison to changes seizure rates demonstrates the efficacy of 
cooperative security mechanisms. Special attention is paid to the form and function of 
organization and military-military cooperative relationships. Changes in state capacity are 
also assessed in the context of the changing security environment to track changes in state 
capacity against changes in state behavior. 
The assessment of the United States includes an examination of the U.S. unilateral, 
bilateral, and multilateral roles in the region. The assessment of the U.S.’s regional impact 
considers changes in policy and subsequent changes in trafficker behavior. The United 
States is the regional hegemon but also a member of the region’s larger community. Its role 
in the region is assessed over the long term to determine changes in efficacy. 
F. DATA AND SOURCES 
The analysis of interdiction related data to determine the impact of various policies 
is inherently difficult. Cocaine producers rarely maintain records that are readily available 
for academic analysis, governments are naturally disinclined to share data, and government 
agencies tend to choose numbers that suit their institutional interests. This paper relies 
heavily on UNODC data and methodologies but also incorporate data from the U.S. State 
Department and, when it is available, the U.S. Department of Defense. Determining if 
increased interdiction relates to increased effectiveness or increased traffic is heavily 
reliant on all parts of the supply chain: production, transport, consumption. 
Determining just how much cocaine states seize annually is surprisingly difficult. 
Theoretically, the best database is the UNODC’s annual seizure report and spreadsheet. 
However, there are numerous inconsistencies between the data currently available on the 
UNODC website and the annual U.S. State Department’s INCSR. In some cases, this 
disparity is multiple metric tons; in others, data is simply missing. For example: in 2007, 
the INCSR reported that the Commonwealth of Dominica seized 353 kg of cocaine while 
the UNODC has no data for that year. Similarly, the Bahamas is reported as having seized 
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630 kg of cocaine in the INSCR and 717.9 by the UNODC database.42 Perhaps most 
egregious is the 2008 INCSR report claiming that by October 2007 Antigua and Barbuda 
had only interdicted 5.7 kg of cocaine while the UNODC claims that 1600 kg had been 
seized.43 Furthermore, UNODC data is inconsistently sourced. A comparison of an INCSR 
cocaine seizure table from 1994–2003 and the UNODC data for the same year appears in 
Figure 1. These disparities create a barrier to analysis. Additionally, available data on 
individual drug seizures is relatively sparse. The UNODC does have an annual individual 
seizures database but it is relatively recent and not well maintained. 
                                                 
42 United States Department of State; Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 
2008 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report; Part 1: Drug and Chemical Control; The 
Caribbean, (March 2008), https://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2008/vol1/html/100778.htm. 
43 United States Department of State, 2008 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report; 




Figure 1.  UNODC Cocaine Seizures for the Dominican Republic44 
                                                 
44 Adapted from United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “UNODC Statistics.”  
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Figure 2.  INCSR Cocaine Seizure for the Dominican Republic for  
1994–200345 
This thesis necessarily relies heavily on UNODC data due to ease of access and 
relative clarity of sourcing data, a feature not found in the INCSR reports. However, this 
data trails off precipitously in 2008–2009 and is nigh non-existent from 2010 to the present. 
Therefore, analysis relies on UNODC data from the 90s through the 2010s, the qualitative 
assessments conducted by the U.S. State Department, DEA, and DoD, and other publicly 
available documents. When necessary it pulls individual data points from the annual 
INCSR to fill in gaps in the UNODC database. In the case of Central America and Mexico 
it makes extensive use of INCSR seizure data from 2009–2016 to compensate for the lack 
of UNODC data. 
Northbound cocaine, Global Production, and Regional Cocaine Flow are all 
estimates. Law enforcement agencies and militaries cannot directly monitor flow and 
production and make estimates based on estimated crop yield and multiple intelligence 
                                                 
45 United States Department of State; Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 
2003 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report; Part 1 Drug and Chemical Control; The Caribbean 
(March 2004) https://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2003/vol1/html/29834.htm. 
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sources. Some of this data is pulled from UNODC databases, other data is pulled from the 
U.S. State Department or the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) annual 
reports. The UN and the U.S. government do not always agree but they usually follow 
similar trends in smuggling. Furthermore, Northbound cocaine includes cocaine destined 
for transshipment to Europe through the Lesser Antilles. A lack of access to source data 
bases, such as the Consolidated Counterdrug Database (CCDB), has necessitated the 
sourcing of estimates from published reports instead of source databases. 
The result of an estimate-based understanding of the cocaine market and ecosystem 
is that it makes wildly different conclusions possible. Some methodologies rely on detected 
suspect maritime tracks and generate cocaine trafficking estimates based on estimated 
cargo while other estimates rely upon acreage under cultivation and known crop yields. 
Sometimes these can produce mismatches in total cocaine trafficked through a country. For 
example, the 2017 INCSR claims that in 2016, 1000 MT of cocaine transited Guatemala 
alone.46 This movement-based estimate fails to account for estimated global production 
estimated at 1125 MT in 2015 by the UNODC.47 
Naturally, more data makes for better analysis. This data exists but is closely held 
by governments and institutions. This makes academic analysis difficult to conduct with 
any accuracy. The UNODC’s drug database is far from complete, updating and expanding 
the Individual Drug Seizures Report would be an excellent start to expanding the material 
available for review. Similarly, JIATF-S operates at an UNCLASS level and much of their 
data regarding suspect tracks and routes could be released for academic and public review. 
                                                 
46 United States Department of State; Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report; Volume 1 Drug and Chemical Control (Washington, DC: 
United States Department of State, March 2017), 167, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
268025.pdf. 
47 United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2017, Booklet 3 Market Analysis of 
Plant-Based Drugs; Opiates Cocaine, Cannabis (Vienna, United Nations Publications, 2017) 26, 
https://www.unodc.org/wdr2017/field/Booklet_3_Cocaine_market.pdf.  
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G. COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES AND THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF 
THE WAR ON DRUGS 
Illicit maritime smuggling is inherently difficult to measure, analyze, and counter. 
Over the course of the last four decades cartels and states have fought each other and for 
years cartels maintained an edge. Operations across borders and territories long stymied 
states and allowed cartels to improvise and adapt. This thesis demonstrates that states have 
finally begun to adapt to this dynamic. Intelligence-sharing and joint operations have 
proliferated and increased state efficacy against an onslaught of narcotics. Interstate 
cooperation enables states to better secure their own waters, enforce their own laws, and, 
ultimately, strike blows against complex cartel criminality. 
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II. MARITIME SECURITY FORCES AND REGIONAL 
CAPABILITIES 
This chapter demonstrates that the Insular Caribbean generally has a higher 
interdiction rate than Central America and Mexico. It compares seizures during the 2000–
2008 time frame to estimated flow through the Caribbean and Central American vectors. 
It then seeks to correlate interdiction rates, changes in cocaine flow, and changes in regional 
maritime security strength. This determines if and how changes in force structure affect 
smuggler route selection. The Caribbean basin sub-regions are assessed by “vector,” or 
general route taken toward the United States, because most publicly available estimates on 
flow do not include “First Stop Country” data. Should consistent data become available 
over time, it would improve the state level analysis of cartel smuggling routes.  
 To determine maritime security strength this chapter utilizes geographic data, 
including coastline and claimed Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), to determine sea space 
control as a factor of platform (any military or law enforcement asset able to facilitate or 
execute an arrest) density and responsibility.48 Using data on MSF strength and quantity 
of cocaine seized this chapter tests for a correlation between strength and effectiveness. 
This chapter shows that simply adding ships or aircraft to a fleet does not significantly 
increase interdiction rates but that the Caribbean consistently maintains a better offshore 
presence. However, it also finds that changes in regional force structures did not 
significantly impact flow and that it likely does not affect cartel vector selection. 
Later regional chapters consider the RSS states, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama on an individual basis and in their 
broader security context. This chapter briefly considers the force structures of Mexico and 
Cuba because both have experienced significant changes in force structure with 
counterintuitive results on trafficker behavior. Trafficker behavior toward Mexico and Cuba 
                                                 
48 “Home Page,” Sea Around Us, accessed 10 March 2018, http://www.seaaroundus.org/; “CIA World 
Factbook,” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed 10 March 2018, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook. 
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makes no sense if traffickers are simply attempting to avoid strong navies. Therefore, these 
states receive brief overview before further consideration in Chapters III and IV. 
A. DETERMINING REGIONAL COCAINE FLOWS 
The data used to calculate regional cocaine flow and regional interdiction as a 
percentage of flow comes from ONDCP estimates on northbound cocaine and regional 
flow. This has produced two data sets representing flow through Central America and the 
Caribbean. These regions are assessed as vectors; as such, Mexico is included in the Central 
American vector and European dependencies are included in the Caribbean vector. 
However, Mexico’s size and strength skews analysis and it is noted when Mexico is 
excluded from the analysis of the Central American states. Additionally, as France, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Spain, and the United States may choose to alter their 
deployed force levels in the region without fundamentally changing their force structure, 
they are omitted from state level analysis. European seizures are listed as a measure of 
overall vector interdiction and are not used to assess force impact. The Caribbean vector is 
referred to as the Independent Caribbean when the various European dependencies are 
excluded and as the Total Caribbean when the various dependencies are included in 
analysis. Tables 1 and 2 represent cocaine flow by region and percentage seized. A lack of 
access to the Consolidated Counterdrug Database (CCDB) and the lack of consistent 
UNODC seizure data past 2008 have necessarily limited my analytic lens to a 9-year 
window from 2000 to 2008. It is also possible that 2007–2008 are inaccurate due to 
incomplete reporting to the UNODC and a 50 MT increase in Colombian seizures. 
These numbers are far from perfect. They represent estimates of estimates, and this 
has resulted in the rather wild skewing of numbers. The Joint Interagency Task Force South 
(JIATF-S) produces an annual Unclassified Commander’s Update Brief that includes 
estimates of regional flow percentages interdicted. Unfortunately, access to previous years 
has proven elusive and the current version is FOUO. In order to keep this thesis at an 
unclassified level, its scope is limited to publicly available information and estimates. 
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(𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒) ∗ (𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤)
= (𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑏𝑦 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛) 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑏𝑦 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛
= 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 






















2000 598 0.635 380 40.60567 0.106983 
2001 563 0.72 405 45.80336 0.113123 
2002 544 0.7 381 25.46971 0.066885 
2003 536 0.77 413 52.93266 0.128253 
2004 528 0.9 475 54.01323 0.113664 
2005 520 0.9 468 65.6248 0.140224 
2006 530 0.9 477 61.16643 0.128232 
2007 545 0.9 491 158.4357 0.323009 











                                                 
49 See Appendix A for source information. 
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2000 598 0.365 218 21 11 0.094551 0.05107 
2001 562 0.26 146 21 11 0.14642 0.075862 
2002 544 0.27 147 14 12 0.092439 0.08181 
2003 536 0.22 118 19 17 0.159661 0.140651 
2004 528 0.1 53 18 14 0.344193 0.270749 
2005 520 0.09 47 29 13 0.625216 0.287367 
2006 530 0.1 53 32 18 0.594845 0.333325 
2007 545 0.12 65.4 22 11 0.338855 0.167335 
2008 572 0.09 51.48 14 10 0.267614 0.188453 
 
There are several caveats that need to be considered: the cocaine bound for Europe 
is not accounted for, these numbers do not account for purity, and there are always 
unknowables. However, if taken at face value, the states along the Caribbean vector seize 
more cocaine as a percentage of total flow than the states of the Central American vector. 
This is consistent throughout the data set. This indicates that interdiction in the independent 
Insular Caribbean and the various Caribbean dependencies occur at a consistently higher 
rate than it does in Central America. This has resulted in a rerouting of northbound drugs 
toward the less effective Central American Corridor. Figure 3 displays this difference in 
regional security apparatus effectiveness and compares it to smuggler route selection. 
Figure 4 displays JIATF-S’s knowledge of smuggler and suspected smuggler movement 
for 2016. While it does not include raw data and does not align with the time frame in 
question it is illustrative of the essential dynamics of smuggler behavior that emerged in 
the early–mid 2000s. 
                                                 
50 See Appendix A for source information. 
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Figure 3.  Cocaine Flow and Regional Efficacy51 
. 
Figure 4.  2016 Suspect Maritime Tracks52 
                                                 
51 See Appendix A for source information. 
52 Christopher Woody, “Here’s How Drugs Are Getting Smuggled from South America to the US,” 
Business Insider, 14 September 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-how-drugs-are-getting-
smuggled-from-south-america-to-the-us-2017-9. 
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B. QUANTIFYING STRENGTH: GLOBAL RANKINGS 
Maritime security strength can be assessed qualitatively and quantitively. Michael 
Morris’s Caribbean Maritime Security includes a methodology for classifying and ranking 
both regional coastguards and naval forces; it provides the basis for a qualitative 
assessment of regional maritime security rankings. His work is based on order of battle 
data (number and nature of ships) and associated shore support facilities. He ranks these 
two categories separately as they have different missions and capabilities. Naval forces are 
regarded as capable of combat at sea while coastguards operate in a paramilitary or 
constabulary role.53 Unfortunately, the last year assessed by Morris is 1992. In order to 
conduct a proper assessment Morris’ methodology is reviewed and his rankings and 
classifications are updated based on data pulled from the annual editions of Jane’s Fighting 
Ships. This provides a rough qualitative assessment of MSF strength. 
Morris’s rankings are useful to a point but less relevant in the modern security 
context. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the traditional internally oriented focus of 
armed forces and lack of external threats means that most regional militaries are necessarily 
internally focused. Furthermore, a historical ranking of regional naval powers places the 
bulk of the region’s navies somewhere between token navies and inshore territorial defense 
navies. A better metric for naval and coastguard potency and ranking is to simply lump 
these forces together and to rank them all as Maritime Security Forces (MSF). Ranking 
MSFs requires the consideration of total maritime potency against scope of waters patrolled 
and protected. Total force is considered but force structure also matters; intercept craft 
(40+kt speedboats), Maritime Patrol Reconnaissance Aircraft (MPRA), and large Patrol 
Craft (PC) all play specific roles in the interdiction process. Here MSF are ranked from 1 
to 3. A Rank 1 MSF is the low end of the capability spectrum, for example: a navy 
consisting of a handful of old Boston whalers would be considered a rank 1 MSF. The 
occasional frigate, corvette, or fast attack craft can be filed under coastal patrol craft and 
usually indicate a Rank 3 MSF. 
                                                 
53 Morris, Caribbean Maritime Security, 11–13. 
 29 
The control of a state’s territorial waters is dependent on the capabilities of 
operational platform types. Smaller craft are best for coastal operations and do not venture 
far from land due to fuel constraints, crew endurance, and sea keeping issues. Larger craft 
are better suited for operations beyond territorial seas, and MPRA assets allow still better 
coverage of a state’s maritime domain. Therefore, platforms are classified as follows: 
Patrol Craft (including corvettes, PCs, and craft greater than 50 ft in length), harbor security 
craft (mostly capable of costal and harbor security), interceptor craft (capable of speeds 
over 40 kts or highspeed craft specifically tasked with intercept duties), and MPRA. These 
are considered against their respective operational zones: total EEZ (sea space extending 
from a state’s shoreline at lower low tide out to 200 nm) and total coastline. Patrol Craft, 
and MPRA are tools for the control of the EEZ while harbor security craft and interceptor 
craft patrol the coastline and territorial sea. MPRA and Patrol Craft can also play a role in 
coastline security. Using the MSF ranking system, a Rank 3 MSF represents a robust state 
maritime security apparatus that can effectively control its coastline and extend its reach 
into its EEZ and a Rank 1 MSF can only secure a small segment of coastline or provide 
security in a port. 
MSF rankings involve a measure of qualitative judgement. Pure coverage is an 
important metric, but there are intangibles that are difficult to directly assess with publicly 
available data. For example, Mexico has less coverage of its EEZ and coastline than 
Honduras, Guatemala, or El Salvador simply due to the size of its coastline and EEZ. 
However, Mexico’s Navy is superior to these smaller MSFs in terms of professionalization, 
communication infrastructure, blue water maritime strength, and MPRA sensors. 
Similarly, the Bahamas has to patrol a massive territory consisting of numerous islands 
with complex shorelines that lower the density of its available platforms. However, these 
platforms are high quality, most are new, and they receive support from the United States 
and the United Kingdom. Conversely, El Salvador has an intense concentration of ships 
and small boats of dubious quality. These guidelines are established in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Maritime Security Forces: Ranking System54 
Maritime Security 
Force Ranking 
Vessel Inventory Capabilities 
3. Offshore MSF All or nearly all coastguard vessel 
categories well represented 
including patrol craft, or even 
corvettes and frigates. May 
include regular naval units. Also, 
generally some MPRA 
Constabulary capabilities in EEZ 
such as search and rescue. Some 
law-enforcement potential in 
territorial sea (i.e., drug 
interdiction, fishing, offshore oil 
installation protection, 
environmental protection). Vessel 
size and allows for longer range, on 
station time, and sea keeping. 
MPRA extends potential reach of 
law enforcement 
2. Inshore MSF One or more (PC) plus modest 
representation of craft at all lower 
levels. Limited MPRA. 
Irregular, spotty law enforcement in 
territorial sea, generally emanating 
from single coastguard base. 
Limited ability to enforce laws or 
interdict in EEZ. 
1. Port-and-harbor 
MSF 
No PC, (PC) or MR and sparse 
representation of craft at all lower 
levels  
Constabulary capabilities limited to 
ports, harbors, and waters in 
vicinity of single coastguard base. 
 
In assessing the Caribbean and Central America, most states are assessed 
individually. However, the RSS countries are assessed as a single unit due to the 
integrative, treaty-based nature of their security apparatuses. These states are small and can 
hardly manage even a Rank 1 maritime security force but together can collectively field a 
Rank 2–3 MSF. Furthermore, the unique legal rights afforded to other members of the RSS, 
including the right of hot pursuit into each other’s territorial seas, allow the RSS to act in 
a truly networked and unitary manner. Both the UN and the U.S. State Department tend to 
refer to the RSS as a single unit. Given the guidelines from Table 3, Table 4 includes an 
approximate ranking of naval power in the Caribbean Basin. 
                                                 
54 Adapted from Morris, Caribbean Maritime Security, 11–13. 
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Belize 18091 26 2 RSS 29173 35 2 
Costa Rica 114426 117 1 Bahamas 104761 354 2 
El Salvador 16618 5 2 Cuba 10125 104 3 
Guatemala 14709 11 2 Dominican 
Republic 
15852 51 3 
Honduras 19891 21 2 Jamaica 18806 42.6 3 
Nicaragua 24750 32 2 Trinidad and 
Tobago 
4200 11 3 
Panama 17409 54 3     
Mexico 31476 40 3     
 
What is apparent upon a review of operational forces is that the Central American 
Bridge states have fewer dedicated offshore platforms. From 1998–2009, Jane’s only listed 
6 MPRA assets for the entire region (not counting Mexico). This limits their organic 
maritime domain awareness. This hinders the abilities of the individual state to act 
unilaterally and adequately control their coastlines. However, regional geography also 
plays a role in relative strength. El Salvador’s MSF is relatively strong. They operate 52 
small craft, 6 large patrol craft, and 2 interceptor craft. This gives them an intense 
concentration of coastline/platform (5.11 km per platform in 2008).56 Despite this 
concentration of force, the lack of MPRA, and general low platform quality relegates them 
to the status of a rank 2 MSF. 
C. MSF STRENGTH DATA: RELATIVE STRENGTH AND 
REQUIREMENTS 
Evaluating MSFs also depends on the size of a state’s maritime space and number 
of platforms. A state with a small coastline, limited EEZ, and no rivers may not require a 
muscular coast guard. Therefore, MSF strength is quantitively assessed using kilometers 
of coastline per platform or square kilometers of EEZ per platform. These metrics require 
                                                 
55 See Appendices B and C for source information. 
56 See Appendix C for source information.  
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a couple caveats: small patrol boats (those under 15 meters or 50 feet) and interceptor craft 
cannot spend prolonged periods at sea and are therefore better suited for coastal operations. 
Larger vessels and MPRA, collectively referred to as Off-Shore Patrol Vessels (OPV), can 
are designed to patrol the EEZ but can aid in coastline security. Therefore, an assessment 
of strength would hold that OPVs can affect coastline security, but small patrol craft cannot 
affect EEZ security. Not all ships can be underway at all times, and not all sea space is 
relevant to trafficking, but as a nation adds to its fleet, each platform needs to cover less 
sea space. Two theoretical measurements of sea control are: 
 
𝐸𝐸𝑍 (𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝐾𝑚)
𝑂𝑃𝑉 (𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑠 + 𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐴)




𝑀𝑆𝐹 (𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑠) 
= 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 Coastline 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦57 
 
Platform responsibility values should, theoretically, be inversely related to cocaine 
seizures. With less coastline or EEZ per platform, each platform will be more effective, 
and seizures will increase. In assessing vector platform density, total EEZ and total 
coastline for the Central American and Caribbean Vectors are compared to total platform 
number by operating area. Table 5 demonstrates the difference between Platform 
Responsibility in Central American and the Caribbean. Central American states have more 
platforms patrolling their coastlines and a much weaker presence in the EEZ when 
compared to the states of the Insular Caribbean. 
  
                                                 
57 Platform Responsibility refers to the total amount of theoretical seaspace each platform is 
responsible for; when responsibility goes up, density goes down. Increased platform density means each 
platform is responsible for less space and vice versa.  
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Table 5. Vector Platform Responsibility58 
 
C. America + 
Mexico EEZ/
Platform 















2000 44895.03 74.34742 122509.9 31.16038 11546 38.28135 
2001 42968.21 62.59289 114204.1 30.58333 11842.05 38.6822 
2002 47902.35 56.15603 116173.2 27.07377 11842.05 38.6822 
2003 47902.35 57.16968 116173.2 27.64017 12048 38.88579 
2004 55008.75 65.16872 118211.3 33.03 11450.58 36.75771 
2005 61799.95 62.84127 118211.3 32.86567 11450.58 36.04049 
2006 62965.99 57.16968 122509.9 31.45714 10909.61 35.35072 
2007 62572.45 54.41924 120322.2 29.75676 11264.39 36.21716 
2008 61799.95 52.96321 112300.7 28.23077 10576.49 33.43122 
 
D. STRENGTH AND INTERDICTION PERCENTAGE: CENTRAL 
AMERICA 
What becomes apparent upon a review of the transit zone is that Central America 
and Mexico have more sea space to control, both in the Eastern Pacific and in the Western 
Caribbean. As a platform’s responsibility decreases interdiction rates should increase. 
These values should be negatively correlated. However, an attempt to correlate Central 
American EEZ/Platform with interdiction rates showed a correlation of only 0.61. The 
correlation of efficacy in terms of coastline/platform was similarly low at only -0.475. This 
demonstrates changes in MSF strength do not statistically affect interdiction rates in 
Central America. Figures 5 and 6 illustrate this lack of correlation between platform 
responsibility and seizure rates. 
                                                 
58 See Appendices A, B, and C for source information.  
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Figure 5.  Central American Vector: EEZ Platform Responsibility v. 
Percentage of Cocaine Flow Seized59 
  
Figure 6.  Central American Vector: Coastline Platform Responsibility v. 
Percentage of Cocaine Flow Seized60 
                                                 
59 See Appendix C for source information. 
60 See Appendix C for source information.  
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E. STRENGTH AND INTERDICTION PERCENTAGE: INSULAR 
CARIBBEAN 
The Caribbean operates more maritime security forces for less total sea space. In 
contrast to Central America, where each ship capable of operations in the EEZ is 
responsible for over 100,000 sq. km (Mexico nearly cuts this in half but plays little direct 
role in collective security), Caribbean security craft only have a little more than 10,000 km 
per platform. The relatively small states of the insular Caribbean have fielded almost twice 
as many PCs, 5 times as many MPRA, and have less total sea space to control than the 
Central American Republics (not including Mexico). 
Changes in MSF levels still fail to generate statistically significant changes in asset 
efficacy in the Independent Caribbean. There is only a -0.53 correlation between EEZ 
responsibility and percentage of flow seized and only a -0.64 correlation between Coastline 
Responsibility and percentage of flow seized. Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the lack of strong 
correlation between regional strength and percentage of cocaine flow seized. 
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Figure 7.  Insular Caribbean Vector: EEZ Platform Responsibility v. 
Percentage of Cocaine Flow Seized61 
 
Figure 8.  Insular Caribbean Vector: Coastline Platform Responsibility v. 
Percentage of Cocaine Flow Seized62 
                                                 
61 See Appendix B for source information. 
62 See Appendix B for source information.  
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F. INTERCEPTORS 
One of the only vessel types to correspond with interdiction rates is the interceptor. 
The ONDCP estimated that 30–67 percent of all U.S. bound cocaine travels by go-fast 
through the Central American corridor during the 2000–2008 time frame.63 This number has 
changed over time and currently stands at percent and percent of suspect movements in the 
Eastern Pacific and Western Caribbean.64 Although the prevalence of the go-fast has varied 
it has become increasingly popular and is currently the preferred method of delivery. 
Corresponding investments in interceptor craft, small boats capable of speeds over 40+kts or 
otherwise specifically assigned to interceptor duties, correlate strongly with increases in 
regional interdiction rates. Central American investments in interceptor craft better correlate 
with regional interdiction efficacy. This correlation is stronger than the correlation of total 
costal platforms, harbor security craft, and offshore patrol vessels and stands at 0.7 which is 
still not statistically significant. Figure 9 demonstrates that, while there is some correlation 
between interceptors and cocaine seziures, it is not statistically signficant. 
                                                 
63 Office of National Drug Control Policy, Cocaine Smuggling in 2007, ONDCP-01-08 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/ondcppubs/publications/pdf/cocaine_smuggling07.pdf, 3. 
64 Office of National Drug Control Policy, Global Cocaine Trafficking (March 2017), accessed 10 




Figure 9.  Central American Vector: Regional Interceptors v. 
Percentage of Cocaine Seized65 
As go-fast cocaine transports dominate transit zone smuggling patterns investments 
in interceptor craft has a logical, although still tenuous, correlation with changes in regional 
efficacy. For example, the year Panama added 2 interceptors its annual seizure rate spiked 
but it is not clear if it was due to these specific craft, earlier organizational changes, or 
deeper cooperation. A more complete dataset from the UNODC’s individual seizures 
database would help to establish causality in this instance. However, the Individual Drug 
Seizure report is only available from 2010 to 2015 and even then, the only country that 
reported individual drug seizures in Central America was Guatemala.66  
In total the region operates more costal security craft and interceptor craft for less 
total coastline than the insular Caribbean but there is not as much correlation between 
coastline/platform or EEZ/platform as there is in the Caribbean. The higher correlation 
between interceptor craft and interdiction rate works logically with preferred smuggler 
transportation methodology during the time frame in question even though the correlation 
to success is tenuous. 
                                                 
65 See Appendix C for source information. 
66 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “UNODC Statistics.” 
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Much like the Central American Corridor countries the Caribbean Corridor 
countries saw the most correlation between interdiction rates and interceptor levels: 0.57. 
However, this remains non-statistically significant and there is a lack of detailed seizure 
data that would show a real connection between seizures and platform levels. 
G. THE IMPORTANCE OF CUEING 
The process of steering surface craft and law enforcement to interdict suspect 
vessels is referred to as cueing. Cueing occurs when a MPRA asset or a maritime 
surveillance radar station detects a potential drug runner. These assets then direct surface 
ships or helicopters to intercept and detain said suspect vessel. States with extended 
coastlines, multiple small islands, and broad swaths of sea space cannot rely on deployed 
surface craft alone because interceptors and patrol boats often lack the endurance to spend 
prolonged periods at sea and are best deployed with specific information. Cueing may also 
take the form of simply informing friendly ships and partner nations of potential drug 
runners, allowing said ships or partner nations to interdict as they see fit. The following is 
a brief discussion on the impact of MPRA and radar stations by vector. 
1. Maritime Patrol, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance 
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s the insular Caribbean maintained a higher 
level of total maritime aviation assets. For the purposes of data entry this included all 
aviation platforms listed in Jane’s Fighting Ships without a detailed assessment of 
surveillance capabilities. The Central American Republics maintained only about 6 
maritime aviation assets in the 2000s while the Caribbean states expanded their overall 
inventory from 27 to 38. However, MPRA force levels and interdiction efficiency only had 
a statistical correlation of 0.42 in the Insular Caribbean and no discernible effect in Central 
America (without Mexico) where stagnant MRPA force levels coincide with an increase 
in interdiction rates. More may not be better; the lack of statistical correlation between 
efficiency and MPRA force levels shows that simply counting planes has limited utility on 
a vector level. Additionally, considerations such as platform surveillance capabilities, 
range, and even age may impact the utility of an MPRA asset. Simply put, a Cessna is not 
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a P-8 Orion. Individual cases like the RSS show slight correlation between changes in 
interdiction rates and the addition of MPRA assets but others remain dispositive. 
2. RADAR Systems and Data Sharing 
RADAR is the other major source of cueing. The 2011 INSCR notes multiple 
organic maritime radar stations coming on line in the Eastern Caribbean in 2010. The 
initiation of one such system in St. Vincent and the Grenadines was followed by the near 
immediate interdiction of a Go-Fast carrying approximately $62,000 in cash.67 A simple 
year-year comparison of 2009 and 2010 demonstrates a nearly 329 percent increase in 
interdictions in the small island nation.68 Similarly, Cuba has a noted network of fixed and 
mobile radar systems that they use to cue either own nation or neighbor state interdiction 
assets.69 The 2011 INCSR notes that Cuba’s radar network and willingness to cooperate 
with neighboring states enabled multiple USCG interdictions and seizures.70 In 2005 
Trinidad and Tobago upgraded its costal surveillance radar and saw a near tripling of its 
annual seizure rate. It is also worth noting that the number of platforms (ships/MPRA) did 
not increase in 2005, but their sensory capabilities and cueing assets did improve.71 In 2005 
the Netherlands decided to invest in the cueing capabilities of their costal surveillance 
networks in the region by purchasing 8 Maritime Small Target Tracker radars across the 
islands of Aruba, Bonaire, and Curacao.72 However, the effect of these additional radar 
                                                 
67 United States Department of State; Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 
2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report; Volume 1 Drug and Chemical Control: Country 
Reports- Croatia through Haiti (March 2011), https://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2011/vol1/
156360.htm#elsalvador. 
68 See Appendix A for source information.  
69 Department of State, 2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. 
70 Ibid.  
71 United States Department of State; Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 
2006 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report; Volume 1 Drug and Chemical Control: The 
Caribbean (March 2006), https://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2006/vol1/html/62108.htm. 
72 “RNLN Orders Small-Target Radar for Caribbean,” Jane’s by IHS Markit, 1 December 2005, 
https://janes.ihs.com/DefenceEquipment/Display/1201725. 
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assets is difficult to track systemically and they may have a deterrent effect. For example, 
the Netherland Antilles reported 9025 kg captured in 2004 but only 1989 kg in 2006.73 
Finding evidence of costal and maritime surveillance RADARs along the Central 
American isthmus is much more difficult. Theoretically, access to RADAR and other 
cueing systems would enable higher rates of interdiction. However, the complex geography 
of coastlines and the frequency of costal fishing traffic give smugglers areas to evade 
detection. This explains the increased impact of additional interceptors in the region. The 
closer correlation may be due to a lack of other cueing assets that allow other states to 
employ their platforms more effectively. 
Increasing radar coverage and increased area surveillance heightens government 
knowledge of the transit zone. This can result in some shocking shifts in data. For example, 
SOUTHCOM notes a massive spike in cocaine smuggling from 2015–2016 but it is not 
clear if this is caused by increased regional awareness or by increased flow.74 However, it 
is likely that previous flow estimates had been low due to lower domain awareness and not 
a steep increase in cocaine production. Such an increase in production would require 
massive cartel investment during a period when the security situation in Colombia was 
improving significantly. As more systems come on line, authorities may become aware of 
additional smugglers which may raise estimates of total flow. Conversely, flow may be 
much higher than suspected but passing undetected. 
H. COMPARATIVE STRENGTH AND COUNTERINTUITIVE TRENDS 
Since the 1990s, the Central America Republics have had better theoretical control 
of its coastline and the states of the Independent Caribbean have had better control of their 
EEZ. During the 2000–2008 time frame the states of the Independent Caribbean had a 
greater theoretical presence in the EEZ than the states of Central America by a factor of 
nearly 10 to 1. When Mexico’s strength is added this trend shifts slightly as Mexico’s 
73 See Appendix A for source information.
74 Kurt Tidd, Posture Statement of Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander United States Southern




impressive maritime airwing and regular line warships (destroyers, frigates, and corvettes 
which are counted as OPVs) potentially compensate for a lack of OPVs in Central America. 
This shows that the Caribbean region has consistently exercised greater control of the blue 
water domain than either Mexico or Central America. However, these force levels are 
relatively consistent from the 1990s when 30–70 percent of cocaine still transited the 
Insular Caribbean. In fact, Caribbean platform density was higher than Central American 
platform density before Cuba demobilized and Mexico started investing in its navy. From 
the 1990s to the 2000s there is a small decline in Central American OPV assets caused by 
Nicaragua decommissioning some large surface craft, however, Nicaragua is not a noted 
transshipment state and invested in high speed costal security craft at the same time they 
decommissioned their blue water patrol assets. 
I. CASE STUDY PREVIEW 
The following states represent puzzles in the counter-narcotics problem. While 
vector level analysis shows that the Insular Caribbean has more platforms capable of 
controlling its EEZ, this has been a long-term trend and changes in force levels do not 
necessarily correlate with the big shifts in cocaine smuggling. Subsequent chapters will 
discuss each individual region and state in detail. This is a brief overview of some of these 
case study states discussed at length in subsequent chapters and focuses exclusively on 
force structures. 
1. Cuba: Shrinking Capability, Enhanced Security 
Cuba is a paradox. At the start of the 1990s it was suspected of being a major 
cocaine transshipment state and had a MSF that rivaled the Mexican Navy. By 1999–2000 
it had essentially completed its post-Cold War draw down and settled into the position of 
a Rank 2 MSF. Its force structure has remained roughly consistent, but cocaine smugglers 
almost completely avoid the island starting in 2000. Constant MSF strength should interdict 
a similar amount of cocaine as a percentage of flow. The fact that seizures drop despite a 
stabilization of force shows that sheer capacity is not key to interdiction. Cuba’s maritime 
security capacity shrank, but interdictions and seizures in the communist state did not begin 
to fall until after the demobilization. This drop does occur in the midst of the Caribbean’s 
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diminishing role in the drug trade; flow estimates from the early 2000s track a general 
decline in the route’s dominance. Additionally, the force draw-down in the early 2000s is 
not particularly sharp and interdictions in 2000 were relatively high despite the 
demobilizations of 1999. 
. 
Figure 10.  Cuban: EEZ Platform Responsibility v. Annual Cocaine Seizures75 
As will be discussed in later chapters, the Cuban case shows that capacity is not the 
sole determinate of interdiction success or deterrence. As an individual state, working 
outside the rest of the system the Cuban government was able to seize a decent amount of 
cocaine transiting its waters and airspace. The fact that 2000–2001 saw a sharp decline in 
seizures and a decline in the dominance of the Caribbean route clearly demonstrates that 
force is not the sole determinant of cartel vector selection. How Cuba managed to steer 
cocaine away and develop this deterrent capability will be discussed in chapter three. 
                                                 
75 See Appendix B for source information.  
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2. The Mexico Problem 
Mexico is a unique case and demonstrative of the problems inherent in a stand-
alone security policy. From 1990–2009 the Mexican navy grew and its force structure 
changed from a traditional blue water force, which mimicked the U.S. navy, to a 
specialized interdiction force. It shed most of its older destroyers and frigates in favor of 
corvettes and large, capable interceptor craft. It acquired more and more capable MPRA, 
including aircraft with advanced radars and optics. By 2009, the Mexican Navy had a 
greater coverage of its coastline than Panama, 54 km/platform to 40 km/platform. As the 
penultimate destination for most cocaine smuggled toward the United States one would 
expect interdictions to rise as a direct result of this expansion. However, annual seizures 
have fallen. In 2001 Mexico seized 29 MT of cocaine, this annual seizure rate dropped to 
3.6 MT by 2014. Over the same span of time Central America has seen a spike in cocaine 
seizures despite a slower rate of MSF strength growth. The increased strength of the 
Mexican navy is either being misused or pushing cartel smuggling routes to the South. 
J. CONCLUSION: NOT JUST PLATFORMS 
The insular Caribbean has interdicted consistently more of its regional cocaine flow 
than Central America. While this is skewed by the spike in seizure percentage from 2005–
2008, a result of reduced global supply and increased Colombian interdiction, it was 
consistent in the early 2000s. However, trends in interdiction are not as closely tied to force 
strength as may have been expected. The major shift from the Insular Caribbean to Central 
America occurred during a period of increasing Caribbean interdiction efficacy not joined 
to a significant increase in Caribbean strength. Cocaine smugglers have thus adjusted to 
perceived and actual relative material weakness. As a lower percentage of cocaine flow is 
seized in Central America it remains the preferred route for smugglers. The Caribbean, by 
fielding a larger number of patrol craft, MPRA, and interceptor craft has made itself a 
harder transit zone and the Central American states, despite their larger sizes, have not 
made maritime security investments sufficient to deter maritime smugglers. This has 
essentially been a constant, the Caribbean has always had a greater presence in the EEZ 
than Central America. The shift in flows occurred despite Mexican and Central American 
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investment and Cuban demobilization. Therefore, force strength as a major determinant of 
interdiction efficacy on a vector level can be eliminated. The major causal factors must be 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 47 
III. THE CARIBBEAN AND COOPERATION 
The Insular Caribbean consists of numerous dependencies, microstates, and two 
(regionally) powerful states. Most states maintain maritime constabulary forces and only 
Cuba and the Dominican Republic have ships that could be considered “combatants.” 
These states are all relatively weak and few possess resources adequate to ensure the 
complete control and security of their respective national waters. This has caused the 
emergence of an overlapping, cooperative, series of relationships and a reliance on external 
support. Some counternarcotics relationships are overt and codified by treaty, others are 
unofficial and executed out of necessity. This chapter studies official regional security 
organizations and the impact of state behavior on cocaine smuggling. It then examines the 
RSS, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Jamaica due to varying levels of regional and 
extra-regional cooperation and their current or past prominence in the drug trade. 
The individual case studies consider platform strength and regional cooperation. 
On a macro scale, where the whole of the Caribbean vector is considered, the addition of 
one or two craft may not be significant but on an individual state basis an additional ship 
or plane may double a state’s ability to project power. Considering the implementation 
dates of cooperative agreements, their assessed efficacy, and the commissioning dates of 
various platforms shows has a greater impact than simply adding platforms. Some of the 
UNODC data is missing from the 1990–2009 time-frame, when relevant this chapter will 
draw on INCSR reports to fill these voids. This is only done for these specific cases and 
not the Caribbean in general. This chapter will show that increasing security integration 
has led to increases in seizures and can generate a deterrent effect. 
A. PHYSICAL AND HUMAN GEOGRAPHIES OF THE INSULAR 
CARIBBEAN 
Geographically, the Insular Caribbean is defined by several features. In the Eastern 
Caribbean there is a chain of small island states referred to as the Lesser Antilles. This 
chain stretches from Trinidad and Tobago, off the eastern end of Venezuela, to Puerto Rico 
and the Dominican Republic. The center of the Caribbean is defined by the gap between 
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Cuba, Jamaica, and Haiti which is often referred to as the “Windward Passage.” North of 
the Windward Passage lie the Turks and Caicos, the Bahamas, and then the Eastern coast 
of the United States. 
The region’s geography and culture has defined the flow of various narcotics, 
especially cocaine. Culturally, the production of marijuana has dominated the region. Its 
use by large sectors of the Afro-Caribbean population has contributed to large scale, long 
term local production and a bustling interisland trade. As marijuana consumption in the 
United States started to climb, Caribbean producers and traffickers were willing to provide 
product to that expanding market.76 These early smugglers adopted numerous tactics in 
their attempts to gain access to the U.S. market. These have involved covert fishing boats, 
pleasure craft, go-fast speedboats, small aircraft that air drop drugs to small boats, 
semisubmersibles, fully submersible craft, and even regular merchant ships. Some cocaine 
smugglers transited the Windward Passage directly to the United States or through another 
transshipment point, other smugglers simply attempted to get their products to Puerto Rico 
where a lack of tariffs and custom barriers with the mainland United States made detection 
difficult. These patterns persist with the bulk of regional cocaine transiting the Dominican 
Republic toward Puerto Rico. Today, some of the cocaine transiting the Caribbean is bound 
for Europe but a large share of Caribbean cocaine is destined for North American markets. 
The insular Caribbean and the various maritime routes transiting through it to the 
United States represent the most economically viable route for drug smugglers. A maritime 
transit allows the criminal organization to carry large cargos and bypass middlemen in 
Central America. The security cooperation mechanisms in place in the Caribbean are 
effective enough to drive traffic toward the more expensive bridge countries and away from 
the faster, cheaper, Insular Caribbean route. They may also act as a deterrent, driving 
traffickers toward Central America in an effort to avoid the better organized Caribbean. 
Since 1990 the region has changed. It has been shaped by both the bilateral 
influence of relationships with the United States and multi-lateral regional relationships. 
                                                 
76 Ivelaw Griffith, “Caribbean Manifestations of the Narcotics Phenomenon,” in Security Problems 
and Policies in the Post-Cold War Caribbean, ed. Jorge Rodriguez Beruff and Humberto Garcia Muniz 
(New York, St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1996), 181–187. 
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Bilateral agreements among regional states have proliferated, as have steps toward regional 
integration. Correspondingly, flow through the region has continued to decrease. From 
2000–2009 smuggling through the Eastern Caribbean, and the Windward Passage declined 
to less than 1 percent of U.S. bound cocaine while flow through Hispaniola remained 
somewhat variable (oscillating from 8–2 percent of total U.S. bound cocaine).77 Today, 
the region is straddled by multiple overlapping security arrangements: the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) is an economically oriented integration mechanism with security 
and law enforcement components, the RSS is an integrated police and military force that 
allows numerous microstates to coordinate, and multiple global powers maintain a routine 
naval presence in support of their dependencies. 
An underlying point of influence in the region is the United States. The U.S. 
Government’s specific role will be discussed in additional depth in chapter 5 but a brief 
overview is appropriate as it shapes the region’s behavior. For example: Operation 
Bahamas Turks and Caicos (OPBAT) is a large, ongoing, highly successful, cooperative 
security operation involving the United States and the United Kingdom. Cuba drove 
cocaine smugglers from its northern waters by closely cooperating with the United States, 
the RSS MSF and most of the region’s navies are comprised largely of ex-US platforms. 
Both of the RSS MPRA assets are gifts from the US, most of the large patrol craft of the 
Dominican Republic’s navy are ex-USCG, and most of the small interceptor craft operating 
in the region are gifts from USSOUTHCOM. The importance of bilateral maritime 
agreements is difficult to underrate. By 2000 nearly all major Caribbean States had entered 
into bilateral maritime agreements with the United States; this contrasts with Central 
America which, except for Panama, only started entering into bilateral maritime security 
agreements in the 2000s. These agreements generally allowed the USCG and the U.S. Navy 
to conduct law enforcement activities in the territorial seas of treaty nations.78 While 
                                                 
77 See Appendix A for source information. 
78 Joseph Kramek, “Bilateral Maritime Counter-Drug and Immigrant Interdiction Agreements: Is This 
the World of the Future?” The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review, 31, no. 1 (Spring 2000), 
150–151, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40166419.pdf.  
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platforms, training, radar stations, and regional coordination systems may be facilitated by 
the U.S. this chapter focuses on local, interstate relationships. 
What is apparent is that the Caribbean states have made consistent efforts to 
coordinate on a treaty basis. As these efforts are increasingly integrative and smugglers 
have shifted the bulk of their traffic. Even Cuba, a regional outlier, routinely pushes track 
data to its neighbors and now stands nearly unmarred by the cocaine trade. However, 
another regional outlier, the Dominican Republic, remains relatively isolated form its 
neighbors and has remained a major transshipment point. The case of the Insular Caribbean 
demonstrates the value of the collaborative multilateral relationship and have deterred 
smugglers. 
B. UN AND INTERNATIONAL TREATY STRUCTURES 
Caribbean and Central American States are, generally, party to a number of UN 
sponsored treaties that have impacts on their collaborative legal rights and obligations. The 
main treaty relevant to the counternarcotics issue is the 1988 United Nations Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psycho-tropic Substances. This treaty 
established the obligation to prevent narcotics trafficking and allowed states to request 
permission to board a vessel flagged to another state with permission.79 This particular 
treaty provides global governments with a generally uniform, prohibitionist stance on illicit 
narcotics but does not establish an operational coordination organization. 
There is are additional extra-regional treaties and agreements. One, signed in 2003, 
involves France, the US, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Guatemala, the Netherlands, 
and Belize.80 It is a multi-lateral collaborative treaty which is designed to accelerate pursuit 
into partner waters and mandates close regional coordination. The other, the Paramaribo 
Declaration, involving the US, UK, France, Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Surinam, 
                                                 
79 “Combating Transnational Organized Crime Committed at Sea,” UNODC Issue Paper (New York, 
United Nations 2013), 27–29, https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/GPTOC/Issue_Paper_-
_TOC_at_Sea.pdf. 
80 Department of State, 2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. 
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Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago, is focused on information sharing and became effective 
in 2006.81  
C. CARICOM AND THE REGION 
The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is the most prominent regional security 
organization, it also focuses on economic development and non-binding cooperation. 
CARICOM essentially amounts to a customs union with security and law enforcement 
powers.82 However, there are concrete security components that underlie the larger 
economic framework. Chief among these is the “CARICOM Maritime and Airspace 
Security Co-operation Agreement” (henceforth referred to as the CARICOM Security 
Agreement). 
Key permissive features of the CARICOM Security Agreement include the right to 
enter, patrol, and conduct law enforcement activities in partner nation’s waters. There are 
caveats regarding ship-riders and notification from partner states but in general this is a 
sacrifice of a degree of sovereignty in favor of security.83 Typically, the conduct of 
activities other than innocent passage cannot be conducted in the waters of a sovereign 
state, sacrificing or augmenting this element of sovereignty eliminates potential security 
seams caused by overlapping and colliding territorial seas. Patrols that cross these seams 
hoist a CARICOM ensign as a sign of their joint security duties.84 Furthermore, while most 
bi-lateral maritime security agreements authorize the boarding of a partner nation flagged 
vessel with permission, the CARICOM Security Agreement allows the requesting state to 
board and search the vessel flagged to the requested state if no response is received within 
                                                 
81 Organization of American States; Intern-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, International 
Anti-Narcotics Conference Paramaribo Declaration, Strategy Document, 1 December 2006, 
http://www.cicad.oas.org/apps/Document.aspx?Id=431; 2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report. 
82 “The Revised Treaty,” The Caribbean Community, accessed 10 March 2018, http://caricom.org/
about-caricom/who-we-are/our-governance/the-revised-treaty/. 
83 “Maritime and Airspace Security Cooperation Agreement,” The Caribbean Community, accessed 
September 2017, http://archive.caricom.org/jsp/secretariat/legal_instruments/
agreement_maritime_airspace_security_cooperation.pdf, 10–11. 
84 Ibid., 12. 
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2 hours.85 The permissive aspects of the CARICOM Security Agreement are not as 
interesting as one of the compulsory elements: data sharing is mandated in Article XII para. 
1. Since the Agreement entered force in 2008 there has been a brief spike in estimated 
regional cocaine flow (roughly 2010–2012, UNODC data is unavailable but ONDCP 
estimates indicate a brief return to the region, mostly to Hispaniola) but a subsequent 
decline in the importance of the route to below 7 percent.86 
Prior to the implementation of the CARICOM Security Agreement the organization 
founded the Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS). Founded in 2005, 
IMPACS is primarily a research, coordination, and advisory body.87 Again, this 
organization post-dates the main shift of cocaine to Central America. Yet, it has an impact 
on how the maritime security environment changed in the 2000s. In July of 2006 IMPACS 
created a regional sub-agency dedicated to sharing information, the Joint Regional 
Communications Center (JRCC).88 The JRCC uses the Advanced Passenger Information 
system (APIS) and the Advanced Cargo Information System (ACIS) to monitor the transit 
of registered vessels, aircraft, passengers, and cargo containers in support of regional law 
enforcement efforts.89 
CARICOM also seeks to create a framework for intergovernmental coordination in 
its CARICOM CSS.90 Two of the document’s 14 goals are particularly relevant: 
                                                 
85 The Caribbean Community, “Maritime and Airspace Security Cooperation Agreement,” accessed 
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“increasing trans-border intelligence and information sharing” and “enhance maritime and 
airspace awareness, strengthen CARICOM borders including contiguousland [sic] 
borders.”91 The CSS also estimates a “significant reduction in crime” within three years of 
implementation. As the strategy was released in 2013 and UNODC data on drug 
interdiction is only available up until 2009 the efficacy of this strategy is extremely difficult 
to discern. 
Formal CARICOM regional security, predicated largely on the above agreement, 
is relatively recent and the multi-lateral functions of the organization did not begin to take 
effect until after most cocaine trafficking had shifted away from the Caribbean toward 
Central America. Furthermore, while written agreements and treaties exist, the UN 
assessed these treaty organizations as less than fully functional or effective in 2007, before 
most of the recent innovations went into effect. That UN report, on “Crime, Violence, and 
Development,” was written in 2007 and attributes most counter-trafficking progress to 
bilateral efforts with the US.92 Therefore, while it may have a deterrence impact and may 
contribute to increasing regional security, it cannot be judged as the primary driver of the 
balloon effect. 
D. INSULAR CARIBBEAN CASE STUDIES 
The following states are selected due to their historical prominence in the 
interisland drug trade. The states of the Insular Caribbean have all taken some form of 
meaningful action against cartel organizations, but some have experienced more success. 
In the Insular Caribbean states have been able to increase their interdiction efficacy through 
cooperative security relationships with their neighbors, which has driven narcotraffickers 
toward Central America. Because this is not a comparative chapter it uses Platform Levels 
instead of Platform Responsibility. This is to determine if additional platforms make a 
significant impact on an individual state level. 
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1. The Regional Security System and the Organization of Eastern 
Caribbean States 
The RSS is a treaty-based organization consisting of seven micro states of the 
Eastern Antilles: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, 
St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.93 These seven states are referred to as the 
Eastern Caribbean and are generally treated as a unitary security force. While this 
organization does not pose a completely unified front, the island chain is intercepted in 
several spots by European dependencies, they do cover a roughly contiguous stretch of sea. 
The essential form of the RSS took shape in the 1970s and 1980s in response to the 
persistent external threat posed by international communism and the decline of the British 
Empire.94 As the empire contracted, and British dependencies gained their freedom, these 
small, English speaking, afro-Caribbean states were incapable of guaranteeing their own 
independence or responding to regional crises. The British facilitated the construction of a 
joint coast guard facility and provided the fledgling force with its first ships in 1979.95 In 
the 1980s, partially in response to the Marxist revolution in Grenada, a Memorandum of 
Understanding was signed between Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Barbados, St Lucia, 
and St. Vincent.96 This organization was and is dependent on external aid and most of its 
platforms are gifts from either the United States or the United Kingdom. 
 In the post-Cold War world, as state defense forces shrank, the RSS expanded, and 
its functions changed from external defense to internal stability operations. It took official 
treaty form first time in March of 1996.97 (The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States 
(OECS) includes Monserrat, Martinique, and Anguilla and acts as an economic 
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counterpoint to the security-oriented RSS. Monserrat, Martinique, and Anguilla are full 
dependencies of France and the United Kingdom. As a result, participation in a mutual 
defense treaty organization such as the RSS is limited.) However, the component members 
of the RSS do seek active, unofficial cooperation with regional partners. In a 2017 Dialogo 
interview Col. Glyne Grannum of the Barbados Defense Force (BDF, a critical component 
of the RSS) cited specific cooperation with Trinidad and Tobago and the French 
dependencies of Guadalupe and Martinique (these territories disrupt the contiguous EEZ 
of the RSS).98 This cooperation is not mandated by an international treaty or agreement 
but appears to occur naturally.  
Collaboration with the French territories interrupting the continuous RSS also 
produced substantial results. In 2008 St. Lucia MSF collaborated with French authorities 
operating out of Martinique to seize over a metric ton of cocaine.99 2005–2007 has a dip 
in RSS seizures but a spike in French seizures, assuming that this is not just statistical noise 
it indicates that seizures in the RSS pushed traffickers to French waters where they were 
caught at a similar rate. The fact that seizures then fall, despite no other major changes in 
law enforcement presence or strength, shows that the route was becoming less viable and 
that smugglers were probably choosing to abandon it. 
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Figure 11.  Cocaine Seizures by State: The RSS and the French Antilles100 
 
Figure 12.  RSS Platform Levels v. Platform Strength101 
However, even before the ratification of the RSS treaty, the Eastern Caribbean was 
noted for its security cooperation and attitude toward drug trafficking. The 1996 State 
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101 See Appendix B for source information. 
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Department INSCR report noted the high level of regional and extra-regional cooperation 
(with European powers and the US) present in the Eastern Caribbean and only 
recommended the ratification of the RSS treaty.102 The 1997 INSCR noted an uptick in 
interdictions in Central America, just the year after the RSS treaty was ratified.103 
Functionally the organization operates jointly on a number issues including 
fisheries patrols, counter-narcotics, mutual defense, Search and Rescue (SAR), policing, 
pollution control, and disaster relief. To this end there are specific carve outs for the right 
of “Hot Pursuit,” which grants constabulary forces of one country the right to pursue 
suspected criminals into the territorial waters of another country.104 In cases where direct 
mutual support is required the host state gains operational command of forces provided by 
the other members of the RSS but the unit commander retains tactical control.105 
Uniformity is further attained by an RSS Training institute which is designed to create a 
relatively even military style tactical skill set in the police forces of states lacking formal 
militaries and interdiction specific training in RSS component militaries.106 
A critical force component of the RSS is the RSS air wing. Consisting of two 
donated Fairchild C-26As the airwing has functioned as effective Maritime 
Reconnaissance and Patrol Aircraft (MPRA) and provided the RSS with organic cueing. 
These aircraft were delivered in 2001 and have been intermittently operational but effective 
when employed.107 Over the span of 6 months in 2005 they were credited with the 
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identification of 26 maritime targets, the capture of 40 smugglers, 480kg of cocaine, and a 
metric ton of marijuana.108 A 2009 blurb on the aircraft claims that the RSS airwing was 
responsible for 356 interdictions and 1791 counter-narcotics missions between 2001 and 
2009.109 These platforms, and the additional interceptors added in 2004 and 2005 provided 
the RSS with significant new operational capabilities. 
UNODC interdiction data indicates that seizures did not start climbing markedly 
until 2001. 2005–2008 show a significant increase in total cocaine seizures in the RSS 
states.110 A paucity of reliable data post 2009 means it is difficult to project the continued 
rate of seizures in the RSS but negative interdiction trends following the successes of the 
major systemic improvements put into place in the mid-2000s and the stabilization of RSS 
force structures and capabilities show that the RSS has fallen out of favor as a 
transshipment point. Subsequent ONDCP and DEA reports on the cocaine have observed 
a reduction in the RSS state’s transshipment role.111 
Furthermore, operational strain in a resource short environment apparently reduced 
the operational capacity of RSS coast guards but not trafficking patterns. The 2008 and 
2009 dip may be attributable to a total reduction in regional MSF strength. A Jane’s report 
on regional readiness found massively reduced operational capacity in 2009 and that the 
RSS had come to rely almost exclusively on the Barbados Coast Guard. In the report the 
Regional Security System Coordinator stated that “The majority of the OPVs are not 
operable.”112 Furthermore, Grantly Watson, the coordinator, claimed that the region’s 
operational problems had persisted for since at least 2006.113 However, the 2009 INCSR 
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does not mention a reduction in regional efficacy other than to state that “St. Kitts’ Police 
Drug Unit has been largely ineffective.”114 Furthermore, the same Jane’s article notes that 
the Barbados Defense Force had been able to maintain patrol operations and compensate 
for a lack of support from its partner nations demonstrating an additional bonus to the 
cooperative relationship: the ability to compensate for weak allies in a collaborative 
security context.115 Despite this reduction in operational ability, and even cocaine seizures, 
smuggler use of the Caribbean fell from 12 percent of north bound cocaine to 5 percent of 
north bound cocaine from 2007 to 2011.116 
The biggest change in the maritime security environment from 2006–2009 was the 
creation of the CARICOM security apparatus. While the RSS did add a few small 
platforms, its operational capabilities had been reduced due to maintenance requirements 
and platform age. The 2009 INCSR notes that Barbados officials reported a reduction in 
seizures and that the Government of Barbados estimated a reduction in trafficking in their 
territory.117 The RSS demonstrates the potential role of relative strength and productive 
cooperative relationships. Despite the reduction in operational capacity from 2006–2009 
the dominance of the Eastern Caribbean route continued to diminish. It is evident that the 
network of collaborative maritime security agreements allowed the Barbados Defense 
Force to compensate for the weakness of its counter-narcotics allies. Aided by the 
implementation of larger security arrangements like IMPACS, the JRCC, the French, and 
the United States, the RSS managed to maintain sufficient efficacy to deter most smugglers. 
2. Cuba: Practical Cooperation 
Cuba’s unique geopolitical situation has long placed it at odds with its neighbors. 
As one of the larger states of the Caribbean region it has long represented one of the 
strongest naval forces; even following the full collapse of Soviet/Russian support its fleet 
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outnumbered those of all other insular powers. However, given the size of Cuba’s EEZ and 
the sheer quantity of coastline it has traditionally needed to control, its naval and coast 
guard forces have long been inadequate. The drawdown in MSF strength is clear going 
back to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent withdrawal of Soviet military 
support. However, Cuba has maintained a hard line against trafficking, even executing an 
army general convicted of trafficking, and routinely coordinates with neighboring 
countries. Cuba is not a member of CARICOM but does cooperate with the region on an 
informal and bilateral basis. Because of these collaborative features of Cuba’s counter-
narcotics strategy, most smugglers avoid Cuban waters and airspace. 
By the year 2000, most of the Cuban fleet had been demobilized. It 
decommissioned its frigates, all but one corvette, and 80 percent of its Fast Attack Craft 
inventory. In total Cuban EEZ platform responsibility had fallen below 50 percent of its 
1990 level.118 This does not even account for operational limitations resulting from a lack 
of fuel. The 1998 INCSR noted a distinct inability to interdict maritime drug-runners due 
to fuel restrictions: “Cuban officials blame their lack of resources for the GOC’s 
[Government of Cuba] inability to patrol its territorial waters. As U.S. Coast Guard reports 
attest, drug traffickers appear to be taking advantage of that inability to an increasing 
extent.”119 This is further reflected in the nature of cocaine seizures, the bulk of 1998’s 
cocaine seizures occurred on land or as a result of smuggler incompetence. Major seizures 
were made at the airport and during port inspections of container ships and the bulk of 
maritime captures stemmed from “wash-ups.” Wash-ups typically occur when aircraft drop 
drugs to waiting boats and the boats fail to recover the entire cargo.120 Trafficker 
employment of Cuban waters provided a work-around, allowing traffickers to bypass the 
relative strength of OPBAT. Figure 5 details the Cuban demobilization in contrast with 
falling seizure rates. 
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Despite trafficker attempts to use Cuba as a transshipment point the Cuban 
government has a history of counternarcotics. Cuba’s opposition to the drug trade is a 
curious mix of revolutionary indignation and pragmatism. The revolution itself occurred 
in part due to the corruption and rampant drug use allowed by the Batista regime and Fidel 
Castro took a hardline almost from the outset.121 The consumption of narcotics was 
considered counterrevolutionary and Castro was unwilling to appear complicit in 
narcotrafficking. At one point in 1985 Castro even proposed direct cooperation with the 
Reagan administration but was rebuffed.122 Thus, isolated, the 1980s and early 1990s saw 
the extensive use of Cuban waters by cocaine smugglers and a fair number of cocaine 
traffickers were Cuban exiles. Even the fictional Tony Montana from Scarface was Cuban. 
However, the Castro government denied any involvement in narcotrafficking and 
vehemently rejected the Regan and Bush administrations’ accusations of collusion. The 
arrest and execution of several high-ranking officials, including General Ochoa in 1989, 
demonstrated Cuba’s counternarcotics credentials and desires. However, the Bush and 
Reagan administrations were unwilling to work with the communist governments and as 
such, Cuba continued to languish in isolation. 
Despite clear indicators of Cuban enthusiasm for the war on drugs, during the 1990s 
Cuba remained a regional pariah due to the vagaries of U.S. domestic politics. The 1996 
INCSR noted a lack of fuel hindering counternarcotics forces. It also noted numerous 
bilateral counter narcotics relationships with Mexico, Jamaica, the Bahamas, Venezuela, 
Ecuador, Panama, and the UK. Deprived of its traditional trading partners in the Soviet 
bloc Cuba was attempting to normalize its relationship with the region through both 
economic and security cooperation. Unofficial coordination with the United States took 
place on a tactical level and produced major results with the 1996 capture of the MV 
Limerick, a fishing vessel carrying multiple tons of cocaine. This led U.S. military and law 
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enforcement leadership to advocate for deeper cooperation with Cuba almost 
immediately.123 However, annual cocaine seizures and capacity dropped to the under 1000 
kg annually (1994, 1995, and 1998). It is only when the Clinton administration starts 
working with the Cuban government in the late 1990s that seizures begin to climb again. 
 
Figure 13.  Cuban Force Levels v. Cocaine Seized124 
1998 saw an expansion of bilateral counter narcotics agreements to Portugal, Spain, 
Colombia, Italy, and France.125 In some cases this included counter-narcotics training 
provided by France and the UK.126 1999 also notes the beginning of routine information 
sharing with the United States Coast Guard with the USCG providing information on air 
tracks and the Cubans providing information on maritime tracks. There were even specific 
instances of collaboration leading to arrests.127 The culmination of US-Cuban cooperation 
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came in 2000 with the official conclusion of a collaborative counternarcotics agreement 
and the implementation of a coordinating mechanism. This coordinating mechanism 
consisted of: the real time exchange of tactical data via a telephone network, coordinating 
frequencies for ship-ship communications, the counter-narcotics liaison of the U.S. 
interests section in Havana, and technical assistance for VBSS (Visitation Boarding Search 
and Seizure) operations.128 This development, facilitated by the Clinton Administration, 
established a cooperative security regime between immediate neighbors. 
Since this transition to more cooperative framework with the U.S. the Cuban 
government claims to have provided the U.S. with cueing data over 500 times.129 The 2007 
INCSR notes specific cooperation and cueing behavior between the Cuban and U.S. 
governments that led to the capture of a Bahamas bound aircraft.130 The increases in airport 
and maritime port security created a spike in interdictions. As cocaine smuggling began to 
shift toward Central America these seizures trailed off. UNODC data shows the brief spike 
in the early 2000s followed by the shift away from Cuba as a transit country. 
Cooperation is not limited to assistance and coordination with extra-regional 
powers and the US. Cuban efforts to establish multi-lateral cooperation with its immediate 
neighbors include proactive attempts to provide both the Bahamas and Jamaica with cueing 
data.131 A 2010 CNN report citing leaked documents notes that Cuba had attempted to 
push track information to the Jamaicans, even going so far as to translate that data to 
English from Spanish.132 
Cuba’s MSF strength has remained about the same since the end of the draw down 
in the late 1990s. The 2005 INCSR claims that Cuba ceased being a common transit point 
due to increased U.S. presence in the Windward Channel, but this is more representative 
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of Cuba’s cooperative approach to the problem. The evolving cooperative nature of the 
US, Cuban relationship has kept interdictions low by deterring traffickers. 
Apparent strain in the US-Cuban relationship, sparked by President Trump’s 
combative rhetoric and policies, have already caused narco-traffickers to reconsider Cuba 
as a transshipment point: “so far in 2017, Cuban officials say they have seized or recovered 
nearly 3 tons of marijuana and cocaine from drug traffickers, more than triple the amount 
of drugs they seized during the first six months of last year.”133 As neither capacity nor the 
working relationship have functionally changed it is likely that narco-traffickers are simply 
being proactive and attempting to revive old routes. 
3. Dominican Republic: Less Than Splendid Isolation 
The Dominican Republic is another traditional smuggling transshipment point. Its 
location in the central Caribbean and proximity to both the U.S. mainland and Puerto Rico 
has made it a crucial transit state. It also operates a MSF and police force roughly 
commensurate with its size. Geopolitics also plays an important role in on the island as the 
Dominican Republic shares a land border with the generally unstable Haiti.134 In recent 
years the instability of its neighbor has limited its efforts to integrate with the larger 
regional community. 
The Dominican Republic is something of a regional anomaly. It is the one of the 
only prominent Spanish-speaking island with the region’s strongest economy and largest 
population. The island has generally sought to align with the U.S. and U.S. policies above 
those of its regional neighbors.135 It also remains an outcast from the larger CARICOM 
security and economic collective. Its multi-lateral preferences have been more closely 
aligned with its linguistic compatriots in Central America and South. This has resulted in 
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its membership in the SICA, an organization from which it is geographically removed as 
opposed to CARICOM and bilateral security treaties and agreements with Mexico, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Honduras.136 Additionally, while it has attempted 
to integrate with CARICOM, relations with Haiti, a CARICOM member state, have 
hindered the Dominican Republic’s efforts. The latest attempt at integration was in 2013 
and it was rejected when the Dominica Republic’s Constitutional Court authorized the 
government to strip Dominicans of Haitian decent of citizenship.137 
The U.S. has noted strong bilateral ties with the island going back to the 1990s. The 
1996 INCSR noted that the Dominican Republic lacked the capacity to secure its coastline 
and that its institutional weakness further limited the government’s effectiveness.138 The 
Dominican Republic has a pattern of facilitating regional cooperative mechanisms. In the 
1990s the INCSR lauded the operations of a Joint Information Coordinating Center (JICC). 
The JICC was an information sharing system operated in coordination with the US.139 In 
general, the U.S. State Department has high praise for the Dominican Republic’s persistent 
bilateral cooperation and in 2003 a comprehensive series of cooperative maritime security 
treaties, some authorizing overflight, were signed.140 However, despite consistent 
cooperation and even U.S. augmentation of Dominican forces the island remains a major 
transshipment states. 
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The Dominican Republic annual seizures experienced a general upward trend in 
cocaine seizures in the 1990s and early 2000s, despite a reduction in the Caribbean route’s 
importance. Therefore, the Dominican navy and Dominican Law enforcement have been 
becoming more effective. Additionally, a lack of strong correlation between platform levels 
and area coverage indicate that fluctuations in the Dominican Republic’s MSF strength 
does not have a real effect on cocaine smuggling. It maintains a larger blue water force 
(patrol craft capable of operations in the EEZ) than its regional partners but lacks the small, 
fast craft operated by some of its neighbors. Additionally, the 2012 and 2013 ONDCP 
reports note that the primary Caribbean transshipment method is to take a go-fast directly 
to the Dominican Republic prior to transit to Puerto Rico or the US.141 Dominican 
Republic’s importance to the cocaine trade increased after 2010, a period wherein they had 
minimized the threat posed by small non-commercial flights through bilateral cooperation 
with the U.S. and additional interdiction assets.142 On a force analysis level the implication 
is that the Dominican Republic’s lack of interceptor craft and MPRA made it vulnerable to 
the go-fast threat. However, the addition of MPRA and interceptor craft does not appear to 
have made a difference. As Figure 14 shows, the addition of MPRA and interceptors does 
not coincide with a major spike in seizures. Additionally, the Dominican Republic has 
remained a favored transshipment state.  
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Figure 14.  Dominican Republic Force Levels v. Cocaine Seized (kg).143 
Despite regular praise for its bilateral cooperation with the United States, the 
Dominican Republic has remained a transshipment point while the rest of the region’s 
importance to the U.S. market has dropped. In 2017 an estimated 60 percent of Caribbean 
flow transited the Dominican Republic.144 There is a potential trafficker centric thesis to 
the Dominican Republic issue; the annual 2017 ONDCP Cocaine Report notes that 
Dominican smugglers maintain a close relationship with Mexican and Colombian cartels. 
If this is the case, the Dominican Republic’s continued importance to the cocaine trade may 
be due to a trafficker unwillingness to sacrifice these routes and relationships. The Mexican 
and Colombian cartels may simply be maintaining this relationship with the Dominican 
Republic because they share a common language and because the Dominican Republic is 
less risky than Cuba. This dynamic may be changing, while the Dominican Republic is still 
excluded from the larger CARICOM security mechanisms, President Danilo Medina just 
signed an intelligence Memorandum of Understanding with CARICOM. This may lead to 
a significant reduction in narcotics smuggling. 
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4. Jamaica: An Inflection Point 
Jamaica is ideally located to act as a maritime transshipment point but its role in 
the cocaine trade has decreased dramatically since 2002. Located at the entrance to the 
Windward Passage between Cuba and Haiti, Jamaica presents a stunning example of the 
utility of bilateral cooperation. Prior to 2000 it is estimated that 11 percent of U.S. bound 
cocaine transited the tiny island. However, despite the fact that the region’s importance 
was decreasing, interdictions increased in 1998, 1999, 2001, and 2002. This correlates with 
the entry of a bilateral security cooperation agreement with Colombia. The UNODC notes 
that in April of 2002 Jamaica officially entered into a bilateral security arrangement with 
Colombia and that three major drug interdictions (1,543kgs, 1,363kgs and 814kgs all seized 
from speedboats) were the result of joint Colombian-Jamaican Security operations and 
intelligence sharing.145 This massive spike in seizures accounted for nearly all of Jamaica’s 
2002 maritime captures and was followed by a sharp drop off in cocaine interdictions. By 
2005 less than 1 percent of all U.S. bound cocaine was estimated to have transited 
Jamaica.146 The deterrent effect of this bilateral maritime security arrangement does not 
extend to other drugs as a marijuana trade with Costa Rica appears to be persistent, but it 
remains a remarkable accomplishment. 
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Figure 15.  Jamaican Force Levels v. Cocaine Seizures (kg).147 
Jamaica in 2002 represents a clear inflection points in cocaine interdiction. In 2003 
the U.S. government began to further back the Jamaicans with additional platforms and 
maintainers, but these platforms were not active until 2004, after the major drop in cocaine 
seizures. This indicates that cocaine smugglers perceived the increased difficulty of a 
successful transit from Colombia to Jamaica and instead decided to alter their routes. The 
subsequent reduction in seizures 2004–2010 correlates with a large a doubling in the 
number of interceptor craft and the addition of a number of MPRA but the larger inflection 
point is in 2003 and therefore pre-dates the addition of extra forces. 
E. CONCLUSIONS: CARIBBEAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS 
In 2002, ONDCP data suggested that Caribbean cocaine flowing through 
Hispaniola constituted about 8 percent, the Jamaica-Cuba-Bahamas route was responsible 
for about 12 percent, and that the Caribbean in general was responsible for 27 percent of 
U.S. bound cocaine. By 2004 these numbers had been effectively suppressed and the 
insular Caribbean accounted for only 10 percent of U.S. bound cocaine.148 However, 
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starting in 2006 Hispaniola becomes the dominant route to the US. Only once, in 2010 after 
the earthquake wrecked most of Haiti’s infrastructure, did the rest of the Caribbean 
dominate the vector’s cocaine smuggling. This trend solidified after 2007–2008 when 
CARICOM signed the CARICOM Security Agreement. By 2012 an estimated 78 percent 
of Caribbean cocaine transited Hispaniola and the bulk of that traffic was to the Dominican 
Republic.149  
 
Figure 16.  Caribbean Vector Route Dominance.150 
The cases of the Insular Caribbean demonstrate the importance of cooperative 
relationships in a changing security environment. As a microcosm of the larger Caribbean, 
the RSS shows the value of a collaborative security arrangement as Barbados compensated 
for the relative weakness of its partner states in the second half of the 2000s. Similarly, 
Cuba made itself a hard transit point through deliberate, consistent, and proactive 
coordination and communication with its neighbors. Cuba’s hardening occurred despite a 
major force drawdown and was clearly a result of its embrace of regional cooperation. Even 
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Jamaica was able to drastically reduce the Colombia-Jamaica cocaine flow simply by 
entering into an intelligence sharing and coordination agreement. However, the Dominican 
Republic, despite changes in force structure and a consistent willingness to act in 
conjunction with the United States has remained relatively isolated from its geographic 
neighbors and therefore subject to continued use by narcotraffickers. Recent developments 
may shift this dynamic, based on observed trends in the Caribbean it is likely that the 
Dominican Republic MOU may produce results. If this is the case, we can expect a spike 
in seizures followed by a precipitous drop in seizures as smugglers abandon the Dominican 
Republic as a viable transshipment point. Cocaine smugglers abandoning the Insular 
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IV. CENTRAL AMERICAN SECURITY: STRATEGIC DISUNITY 
IN THE CONTEXT OF AN ADAPTABLE SMUGGLING NETWORK 
In stark contrast to the Insular Caribbean, the states of Central America lack large 
scale, meaningful, multilateral security coordination mechanisms. However, in certain 
cases, bi and even trilateral security mechanisms facilitate cross-border and maritime 
security cooperation. Economic unity and free trade agreements have reduced border 
controls, allowing for economic development, the ready flow of goods, and secreted 
narcotics. In contrast to the smaller Caribbean States, the Central American States are less 
capable and less united. 
This chapter will examine Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, and SICA. The focus in 
this chapter is the individual states and their relationships with their immediate neighbors. 
In part, this is because these states do not act under true regional cooperation frameworks. 
Those mechanisms and bodies that do exist are generally advisory and do not seem to carry 
the heft of treaties. 
This chapter will also discuss Mexico’s relationship with the region. Mexico and 
Colombia can both safely be deemed regional powers; by most measures they operate far 
superior, or at least larger, security forces than the rest of the region. But Colombia has 
chosen to reach out to the countries beyond its borders while Mexico has remained 
relatively disengaged. Following the successes of Plan Colombia and working in 
conjunction with the Obama administration, the Colombian government has exported 
security training and intelligence in a manner that is not apparent in Mexico.151 Mexico’s 
aloof relationship with the Central American Republics warrants attention as it relates to 
Guatemala especially. This persistent lack of cooperation allows large shipments of 
narcotics to transit the region with relative ease. 
                                                 




Figure 17.  The Broader Context: The Caribbean and Central America152 
A. CENTRAL AMERICA: KEY GEOGRAPHIC ELEMENTS 
Central American geography and infrastructure has come to dictate and define 
regional cocaine flows. Geographically separated from South America by the Darien Gap, 
there is no reliable overland route from South America to North America. This mandates 
that cocaine travel by sea or air at some point. There is, however, the Pan-American 
Highway, which runs from Panama and all the way to North America. In the context of 
weak Central American states these land boundaries present an additional vulnerability. 
Many of these states do not have firm control of their land borders and the Pan American 
Highway is frequently used for overland transportation into Mexico. Therefore, when states 
can exert more air or sea control, traffickers merely need to land further down the coast 
and cargo can be shifted to overland transportation. Even if states seek to control major 
border crossings traffickers can often use to poorly patrolled jungle or river crossings. This 
is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that, despite the continued dominance of Central 
America and Mexico as a transshipment route, cocaine seizures in Mexico have decreased 
every year since 2007, the start of Felipe Calderón’s drug war and despite an increase in 
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naval building and maritime surveillance capabilities.153 This is a direct result of 
traffickers using overland routes from Central America. 
The great irony of the Central American Isthmus is that weak economies have 
attempted to combat economic poverty through the “Washington Consensus.” The 
“Washington Consensus” relies on free trade and open borders. However, moves toward 
free trade and the free flow of goods have allowed narcotraffickers to hide narcotics in the 
routine traffic between nations. Thus, while regional integration efforts like the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and SICA may facilitate free trade they also 
enable illicit traffickers. This has contributed to the flexibility of maritime trafficking, 
allowing cocaine to land in one country and transit overland toward Mexico with minimal 
inspection. 
B. MEXICO AND REGIONAL POWER 
As the final transshipment point for cocaine and a major producer of opiates, 
Mexico has long been ravaged by crime and narco-terrorism. During the 1980s cocaine 
transshipment through Mexico emerged as an alternative to direct shipment to the United 
States. Mexican smuggling networks for heroin and marijuana had already been established 
and a U.S. led Caribbean crack down prompted Colombian-Mexican Cartel 
cooperation.154 However, since the mid-2000s, Mexican maritime counter-narcotics and 
the expansion of the Calderón administration’s drug war seem to be playing a role in 
pushing maritime drug smuggling south toward Central America. This illustrates the 
relative vulnerability inherent to maritime traffic over land traffic; vessels at sea are easier 
to see and less common than vehicles on land. 
Cocaine initially flowed across the insular Caribbean, most often transiting directly 
to Florida through the Bahamas. Initially, cocaine trafficking to the U.S. was dominated by 
Colombians, namely the Cali and Medline Cartels. During the mid-1980s, in an early 
example of the balloon effect, Pablo Escobar sought to avoid increased law enforcement 
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in the Bahamas by seeking a partnership with Felix Gallardo in Mexico. Preexisting 
Mexican networks and routes allowed the trade to pass into Mexico and began the shift in 
cocaine flow. Colombian cartels essentially used the Mexican smuggling organizations as 
transportation sub-contractors. In the early 1990s this trade shifted from a direct cash 
commission to a share of cocaine brought across the border.155  
 
Figure 18.  North American Cocaine Seizures156 
There is clearly an uptick in U.S. interdictions prior to Mexican interdictions 
followed by a relative stabilization of the Mexican interdiction rate, despite a putative shift 
in cocaine smuggling through Central America and Mexico. This illustrates the emerging 
importance of the Central American-Mexican route and corresponds with the Escobar-
Gallardo connection. Logically, smugglers would rely on direct transit to Mexico by sea or 
air. Despite the Mexican–Central American corridor becoming more popular in the 1990s 
and early 2000s, interdictions essentially flatlined. 
This leveling off and decrease in Mexican interdictions appears to be the result of 
an emerging trafficker reliance on the overland route into Mexico. The decrease in seizures 
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is due to the typical multi-ton size of maritime interdictions, as fewer vessels made directly 
for Mexico in favor of overland transshipment through Central America, Mexican cocaine 
seizures decreased. Thus, increases in Mexican maritime security deterred shipment 
directly to Mexico. This trend started when Mexico began to invest in interceptor craft, 
starting in 1993. This maritime security expansion would start with just 2 patrol craft 
capable of 40+kts but would eventually expand to a fleet of over 120 assorted small boats 
and Fast Attack Craft (FAC) capable of speeds in excess of 40 kts.157 In comparison to the 
Central American Maritime Security Forces (MSF) the Mexican Navy and coast guard is 
able to exercise much better control of its EEZ and, despite having fewer platforms in 
relation to its extensive coastline, fields a far larger total number of interceptor craft. The 
current Mexican Navy is fairly strong and highly specialized. Bunck and Fowler indicate 
that the impact of Mexican vigilance is not limited to the maritime sphere alone. In the 
1990s drug flights had landed both in southern Mexico and in Guatemala. However, in the 
late 1990s Mexico began to increase its counter-air efforts and drove the air bridge south, 
into Guatemala and Honduras.158 In the mid-2000s, coinciding with the implementation of 
the Merida initiative, an increase in Mexican investment in maritime interdiction assets, 
and Felipe Calderón’s drug war, cocaine began to land in Central America for an overland 
transit north.159 The large number of interceptors and MPRA (again, a number in excess 
of the Central American total) combined with Mexico’s existence as a single political unit 
and the fact that the Mexican Navy can operate all along its coastline to make the Mexican 
navy a daunting obstacle to maritime narcotraffickers. The increased risk and exposure of 
direct maritime shipment to Mexico is the same factor limiting direct shipment to the 
United States through the Caribbean. This pushed maritime smuggling south toward the 
Central American republics. 
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Figure 19.  Mexico-Central America Platform Responsibility.160 
C. CENTRAL AMERICAN CASE STUDIES 
The following cases are selected based on their recent prominence in narcotics 
trafficking. Guatemala and Honduras are both close to Mexico and adapted to this 
proximity in different ways with similarly disappointing results. Panama has been selected 
due to its proximity to Colombia and the interesting trilateral cooperative security 
arrangement that has developed with its neighbor to the south and the hemispheric 
hegemon. 
1. Guatemala: So Far From God, So Close to Mexico 
Guatemala’s proximity to the penultimate transshipment state, Mexico, had made 
it an increasingly appealing target for narco-traffickers seeking to bypass the relatively 
powerful Mexican Navy. A 2009 UNODC report held that 90 percent of cocaine bound for 
the United States transited Guatemala and that the bulk of this traffic came overland from 
Honduras due to poor border control.161 Historical animosities kept Mexican–Central 
American border cooperation at a minimum until 2012, when minor attempts at 
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cooperation began to emerge.162 The first real effort at cooperative border control came in 
2012 when the Guatemalans announced the construction joint border base a Mexican-
Guatemalan security conference in 2013.163 However, it is not clear that these efforts 
amounted to much and the 2017 INCSR fails to note any cooperation at all between Mexico 
and Guatemala.164 Added to historical animosity is Mexico’s treatment of Central 
American refugees. President Enrique Peña Nieto’s 2014 decision to crack down on 
Central American refugees, carried out at the behest of the Obama administration, has 
resulted in the widespread criminal abuse of Central American citizens and act as a 
potential barrier to future cooperation.165 Finally, economics dictate that fewer 
intermediaries mean bigger profit margins; as U.S. and Mexican maritime border security 
has improved, this economic impulse drove supply through the closest, weakest state: 
Guatemala.  
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Figure 20.  Guatemalan Platform Levels v. Cocaine Seizures (kg)166 
Platform strength matters in Guatemala, but cooperation seems to be driving 
seizures. For example, the 2000 drop in seizures, in spite of constant force levels is 
attributed to a crisis of endemic corruption and high personnel turnover.167 The U.S. State 
Department credits the gains of 2002 and 2003 with increased Guatemalan internal 
coordination and bilateral cooperation with the United States, including the passage of a 
cooperative maritime security agreement.168 However, Guatemala is still a lesson in why 
force structure can matter: in 2004 it had to ground most of its A-37 light attack aircraft 
and helicopters due to maintenance issues, a problem that lasted into 2006.169  
                                                 
166 See Appendix C for source information. 
167 United States Department of State; Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs, 2000 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report; Volume 1 Drug and Chemical Control: 
Canada, Mexico, and Central America, (2001), https://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2000/888.htm. 
168 United States Department of State; Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs, 2003 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report; Volume 1 Drug and Chemical Control: 
Canada, Mexico, and Central America, (2004), https://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2003/vol1/html/
29833.htm. 
169 United States Department of State; Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs, 2006 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report; Volume 1 Drug and Chemical Control: 
Canada, Mexico, and Central America, (2006), https://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2006/vol1/html/
62107.htm. 
 81 
The nature of Guatemalan security cooperation changed recently as the Guatemalan 
government took steps aimed at increasing internal security and regional security with its 
immediate neighbors: Honduras and El Salvador. These efforts aimed at increasing land-
border security in response to the long-term trend of traffickers landing all along the 
isthmus then moving shipments overland using the Pan American Highway. The 
importance of the Pan American Highway is illustrated by the fact that the largest cocaine 
bust in Guatemalan history was actually a land based seizure of 3.3 MT.170 The effect of 
these emerging collaborative operations, combined with internal reforms, seems to have 
had a counter intuitive effect, as narcotics smuggling in the Pacific has moved to bypass 
countries further down the isthmus and concentrate on Guatemala.171 This indicates that 
Guatemala’s land borders with its neighbors may be more secure but in the absence of an 
adequate maritime security force and a lack of meaningful cooperation with Mexico, the 
incentive to land in Guatemala remains. 
Although the 2010s are outside the scope of my force structure study, the seizure 
rates of the last 16 years are remarkable and the biggest changes in seizure rates coincide 
with changes in Guatemala’s relationship with its neighbors. The climb in seizures from 
2000 to 2003 coincided with an increase in bilateral cooperation with the United States but 
the astronomical surge from 2015–2016 correlates with the start of multilateral relations 
with its immediate geographic neighbors.172 The 2017 INCSR maintains that this surge in 
seizures is due to the increased importance of Guatemala as a landing zone but this is 
counterintuitive because starting in 2012 the Guatemalan government began consistently 
seizing more cocaine than Mexico.173 
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Figure 21.  Mexican and Guatemalan Cocaine Seizures174 
2. Honduras: Adopting the Guise of Counternarcotics Cooperation 
Honduras struggles with corruption and a sparsely populated Caribbean coast that 
have made it an appealing cocaine transshipment point since the 1980s. It is an example, 
not of pervasive maritime smuggling, but of airborne cocaine smuggling. While Honduras 
remains an unstable, corrupt state, actions taken since the 2009 coup seem to have 
effectively stifled airborne cocaine smuggling to the isthmus for a time. A brief lull in U.S. 
material and economic support provoked by the coup resulted in an increase in the quantity 
of cocaine transiting the country and reignited aerial smuggling into Honduras. This trend 
seems to have reversed only in response to the 2014 decision to implement a shoot-down 
policy. Even though the United had temporarily stopped sharing radar data with Honduras 
in response to the shootdown policy, air smuggling was effectively deterred. This is 
because Honduras acquired its own radar stations could detect and intercept inbound drug 
flights. This combined with a demonstrated willingness to shoot down suspect planes and 
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has resulted in the decline of the Honduran airbridge.175 Honduras, while operating as an 
independent unit, appears to have reduced its importance to aerial smugglers. 
Honduras has adopted several other internal reforms of questionable efficacy since 
the coup. In 2014 Honduras adopted a version of the Interagency Task Force model in the 
form of the National Interagency Task Force (FUSINA).176 This appears to have been 
generated organically as a part of President Hernandez’s broader approach to 
counternarcotics operations.177 While FUSINA has the potential for success it is not clear 
that it will be able to deliver. The nonexistent response in 2016 to narcotrafficking indicates 
that the systemic corruption that has long plagued Honduras has severely limited the states 
meaningful maritime interdiction efficacy.178 
Honduras has made several attempts to coordinate security with its neighbors and 
the United States, but the inherent weakness of the Honduran state indicates the limits of 
the collaborative advantage. In 2011 and 2012 there was a notable spike in interdictions 
that is directly attributable to cooperation with the United States, but endemic corruption 
seems to be affecting state capacity. Some of these large seizure operations were carried 
out with U.S. personnel.179 The 2013 fall in seizures to under 2 MT occurred despite a 2 
percent uptick in the importance of the Western Caribbean route.180 In 2016 Honduras had 
permanent, bilateral JTFs with both of its neighbors and received 100 pieces of actionable 
maritime smuggling intelligence from the United States but was unable to act on any of 
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them.181 Additionally, the current chief of police is accused of having facilitated a cartel 
shipment in 2013.182 Thus, despite having deterred some aerial cocaine smugglers, and 
experienced maritime success, smuggling remained constant and Honduras did not report 
seizing any cocaine at all to the U.S. State Department.183 Honduras since is an example 
of a state attempting to take multilateral actions but failing due to a lack of internal ability. 
The state appears to have the capacity and some of the structures that would be required 
for cooperative multilateral security but since 2013 appears it appears that either the 
Honduran state or elements of the Honduran security forces have been corrupted to the 
point that practical cooperation does not actually occur. 
3. Panama: Intelligence Sharing against the Flood 
Panama is a state doomed by its geography. Located near the main source of U.S. 
bound cocaine, Panama seizes more cocaine than any other country in Central America. At 
an average seizure rate of 47.6 MT annually between 2007 and 2016, the Panama of the 
21st century has come a long way from the narco-state of Manuel Noriega. Much of these 
gains have come in just the last decade. In 2007 Panama seized a record 60 MT, since then 
Panamanian seizures have consistently annual rate Mexico, cocaine’s penultimate 
destination. However, 2006 only saw the seizure of 3.6 MT. Additionally, route flow had 
essentially stabilized to Central America and Mexico by 2004. Panama’s consistent success 
in seizing large quantities of cocaine since 2007 is a result of its desire to work 
cooperatively with its neighbors. Panama remains one of the only Central American states 
to maintain a treaty-based counter-narcotics arrangement with an immediate neighbor, 
Colombia.184  
Panama’s growing maritime security infrastructure plays a role in its independent 
cocaine seizure rate. Panama added its first interceptors in 2005, by 2007 the number had 
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risen to 6. While these did, undoubtedly, have some influence on interdictions in the 
Central American Republic the addition of several additional interceptor craft in 2011 does 
not appear to have had an additional a positive impact on cocaine interdictions.185 In 
Panama, the collaborative mechanism seems to have a stronger impact than mere platform 
strength as increasing internal integration has generally coincided with increased 
interdictions. The move toward a unified National Air-Naval Service (SEAN) took time 
but the body has proved extremely effective.186 The INCSR for 2016 also notes that, when 
cued by MPRA, Panama maintained a 100 percent interdiction rate.187 When compared to 
Honduras’ dismal 2016 track record Panama demonstrates that simply having ships or 
coordinating institutions is insufficient, they need to be effective. 
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Figure 22.  Panamanian Platform Levels v. Cocaine Seizures (MT)188 
The Panamanian collaborative impulse carries into the state’s bilateral relationships 
with its neighbors. These started in 2002 with the extensive Salias-Becker Treaty, a security 
treaty giving the U.S. broad powers and authorities to patrol Panamanian waters and assist 
the SEAN.189 In 2003 Panama began border security cooperation with Colombia under the 
Bilateral Border Commission.190 In 2011 this cooperation was solidified under the 
Bilateral Border Security Plan.191 The 2008 INCSR notes that Panama, in addition to 
capturing 60 MT of cocaine with U.S. assistance, provided data to the U.S. that resulted in 
the capture of 32 MT of cocaine.192 Additionally, the National Border Service 
(SEANFRONT) has become proficient enough to provide training to Panama’s neighbors: 
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Costa Rica, Belize, Guatemala, and Honduras.193 Panama is not just a lone actor, Panama 
is well integrated with its neighbors and currently acts as an exporter of security. 
D. CENTRAL AMERICAN INTEGRATION: A LONG-AWAITED, 
HALTING STEP 
While the individual states of the isthmus may cooperate, Central America 
functions without a true multi-lateral security frame work. While there are some bilateral 
relationships (mostly with the US, Colombia, and occasionally Mexico), most security 
arrangements only include one or two Central American States. Other than the OAS the 
only real exception to this trend is the SICA which is focused on economic integration and 
development. 
These efforts at regional security cohesion are not very effective. While SICA does 
maintain a security commission and does puts out the occasional strategic plan, a 2013 
report to the U.S. congress described Commission as essentially advisory.194 As noted by 
a 2012 Insight Crime report, “The Central American Integration System’s annual summits 
are often heavy on rhetoric and weak when it comes to actual funding or policy 
commitments.”195 There is no joint command like the Caribbean’s RSS. Furthermore, 
there is little evidence that any of SICA’s counter-narcotics strategies have been put into 
effect. One of the primary counter-narcotics goals of the 2011 strategy was to “promote the 
adoption of a memorandum of understanding on international drug trafficking” which 
would “establish and coordinate procedures to regulate the identification, capture, 
interdiction, and interception by land, sea and air [sic], of ships or aircraft through national 
grounds.”196 However, as noted in a 2013 report to congress and a 2015 profile of the 
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Honduran security situation, most of these multi-lateral commitments remain rhetorical.197 
Thus, inclusive regional security cooperation remains an unrealized, rhetorical goal as 
opposed to a genuine strategy. 
However, there are strains of emerging operational cooperation. The operational 
nature of these frameworks makes them somewhat ephemeral. A task force can be stood 
up only to dissolve as political interest wanes. As a result, recent attempts at regional 
integration have not persisted long enough to represent permanent change but they are 
worth reviewing. 
The military-military collaborative dynamic has generated operational cooperation 
where treaty-based cooperation may not be ratified due to ingrained political fears and 
longstanding border disputes. In the Northern Triangle this has generated programs similar 
to Operation Martillo but instead lead by the smaller Central American Republics and 
backed by the United States.198 The Maya-Chorti task force, a joint Honduran-Guatemalan 
effort launched in early 2015, is one such effort. The new task force has broad authorities 
that may have been considered politically unacceptable in previous decades. Beyond 
simple intelligence sharing and coordination, task force members are authorized to make 
arrests on both sides of the border. Maya-Chorti also seeks the integrated coordination of 
air, sea, and land assets.199 This Northern Triangle JTF was joined in 2016 by JTF Lenca-
Sempul, a Honduran-Salvadoran border security JTF.200 A brief review of cocaine 
interdiction indicates that 2016 saw an uptick in seizures in both El Salvador and 
Guatemala; from 2.4MT to 12.2 MT and 7.3 MT to 18.5 MT respectively.201 The logical 
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conclusion to these bilateral JTFs came in December of 2016 with the announcement of a 
Tri-National Anti-Gang Task Force.202 The Tri-National JTF is essentially an umbrella 
organization that incorporates the preexisting JTFs as components of a larger approach to 
crime, gangs, and smuggling in the Northern Triangle.203 As the Tri-National force has 
been in action for less than a year its utility is difficult to assess. 
Indeed, bilateral and tri-lateral security organizations are beginning to emerge 
throughout the region. Honduras has started coordinating with Nicaragua in a joint 
operation known as Operation Morazan-Sandino.204 In a relatively short period of time 
this joint operation was able to seize 450 kilos of cocaine (about 6 percent of the annual 
total for Nicaragua and Honduras).205 This cooperation occurred despite the lack of an 
official counter-narcotics treaty between the two states.206 Despite the lack of an official 
treaty framework, joint operations appear to have continued along the poorly patrolled 
Nicaraguan-Honduran Caribbean coast. This cooperation has led to the destruction of large 
portions of the local marijuana crop.207 
There are hints at potential regional frame works emerging through these JTFs. In 
2016 a Honduran colonel noted that CFAC was also acting as a framework for regional 
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cooperation.208 CFAC includes Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and the 
Dominican Republic and had traditionally served only as an annual coordinating meeting. 
Its potential evolution into a truly collaborative structure based on information sharing and 
cross border cooperation may result in an uptick in interdictions and an overall reduction 
of flow. However, neither CFAC nor the JTFs have treaty underpinnings.209 This makes 
their futures relatively uncertain. Additionally, their heavy reliance on U.S. training and 
funds exposes them to operational irrelevance in the face of a potential Trump 
administration draw down. 
E. CONCLUSION: CENTRAL AMERICAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS 
Central America demonstrates the complex interaction of state capacity and 
interstate cooperation. An individual state may deter trafficking by adding new ships and 
shooting down planes may scare traffickers off a route, but security cooperation and 
operational proficiency are what increase overall interdiction rates. The Mexican Navy’s 
expansion and Felipe Calderón’s crack down did not actually result in increased cocaine 
seizures; traffickers simply shifted south. Honduras’ shoot down policy severely limited 
airborne smuggling through the isthmus but smugglers went below the radar and trafficking 
shifted to the sea. However, operating in a cooperative environment, Panama raised and 
maintained an extremely high seizure rate and Guatemala has been able to raise its seizure 
rates. The emerging collaborative trend may result in cocaine interdiction rates sufficient 
to undermine the region’s predatory transnational criminal networks. A major sign of 
progress is the fact that between 1980 and 2015 global cocaine seizures have gone from 
20–24 percent of global supply to 45–55 percent of global supply.210 Examining future 
developments in regional relations and operational organizations in the context of 
increasing seizures will indicate the efficacy of these emerging institutions. 
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V. HEGEMONIC ACTION AGAINST A COMPLEX 
CRIMINAL THREAT 
The United States plays an undeniable role in regional security and narcotics 
interdiction. With its muscular economy and military, the United States fields its own 
forces and supports the security forces of many of its regional partners. U.S. policy overlays 
regional security efforts and its increasing involvement in the region has shaped the 
evolution of the regional maritime security environment. Accordingly, trafficker behavior 
is directly affected by U.S. policy. 
The U.S. government has taken three approaches to the region: it has acted 
unilaterally, bilaterally, and to foster multilateral organizations and operations. Each of 
these approaches is only possible due to America’s disproportionate strength, but all of 
them approach the problem differently and some exist simultaneously. However, the 
modern maritime security environment is the product of gradual evolution, this evolution 
coincides with increasing interdiction rates. Since the George H. W. Bush administration, 
each administration has taken a different, deepeining approach to the region. These 
approaches have layered and built on each other.The sheer weight and relative power of 
the United States ensures that U.S. policy affects the flow of illicit narotics. What is less 
clear is how U.S. actions and policies act upon the complex networks of smuggling that 
overlay the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific and if it is the main determinant of trafficker 
behavior. This chapter examines how the United States has changed its approach to the 
maritime counternetworking problem overtime and traces the impact of these policy 
changes on the regional maritime security environment. It shall argue that while monopolar 
strength is effective to a point, the largest increases in interdiction and security occur when 
the United States works with and enables regional partners and organizations. 
A. UNILATERAL ACTION: THE DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN MIGHT 
The U.S. impetus for regional action has been largely based on the domestic war 
on drugs. Rooted in prohibition and the crusades of Henry Anslinger, the modern war on 
drugs found form under the Nixon administration. However, early government action was 
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domestic and aimed at domestic audiences. It was not until the 1980s under the Reagan 
administration that proactive, overseas counter-narcotics efforts began to receive priority. 
These measures included using the USCG and the U.S. military in counternarcotics 
roles.211 American interdiction efforts began unilaterally and, although bilateralism and 
multilateralism have emerged as important tools, unilateral strength remains a major factor 
in the efficacy of interdiction efforts. 
Modern unilateral power is best illustrated by the operational ability of the USCG. 
The USCG seized 91.824 MT of cocaine in 2010 alone, nearly 12 percent of all cocaine 
produced in 2010 and more than the total quantity seized by most countries.212 The USCG, 
supported by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) represents the largest, most effective 
maritime security force in the region and in the world and operates as the main basis for 
U.S. maritime presence in the region. 
Institutionally, U.S. unilateralism has long been expressed in the employment of 
the Joint Task Force (JTF) and Inter Agency Task Force (IATF) formulas. In the 1980s, 
the first JTF centered on Florida and was headed by Vice President Bush, this JTF made it 
harder to smuggle drugs into Florida and resulted in the use of creative landing points 
further up the East Coast of the United States.213 After attempting to implement various 
coordinating mechanisms throughout the 1980s, the 1989 National Defense Authorization 
Act gave the DoD the impetus to create several JTFs with the goal of stemming 
narcotrafficking.214 In 1980, the U.S. only seized 3.4 MT of cocaine, by 1985 it was seizing 
25.7 tons, and by 1988 the U.S. government was seizing over 100 MT of cocaine 
annually.215 The JTF formula would eventually become the IATF formula. As a 
mechanism for coordinating the “whole of government” approach, it is considered 
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extremely successful.216 The IATF model is even used by partner nations like Guatemala, 
Honduras, and El Salvador, although these states still use the term JTF. 
One of the clearest documented shifts in cocaine smuggling stems from America’s 
outsized unilateral power. The deployment of Airborne Warning and Control System 
(AWACS) aircraft to the Caribbean caused Colombian cartels to seek alternative means of 
product shipment. Roberto Escobar, Pablo Escobar’s brother, details how the AWACS 
deployment caused Pablo to seek a relationship with the Mexican smuggling and 
distribution networks initially headed by Felix Gallardo; “after Customs began using 
AWACS, Pablo decided to change routes again and began bringing merchandise into the 
U.S. through Mexico.”217 This initial shift took advantage of preexisting smuggling routes 
and drug distribution networks often utilized for marijuana and heroin distribution. It also 
marked a trafficker response both to platform deployment and, specifically, to the actions 
of the United States. 
The importance of U.S. maritime power in the fight against trafficking is also made 
clear in the wake of Sequestration. 2013’s budget issues and sequestration witnessed a 
reduction in maritime security operations and U.S. maritime security force deployments to 
the Caribbean and Central America. This coincides with a brief swing back to the 
Caribbean. This swing came from a low point in 2011 when only 5 percent of U.S. bound 
cocaine transited through the insular Caribbean to a full 16 percent in 2013 with 
sequestration having gone into effect in March of that year.218 Sequestration caused the 
USCG to reduce its interdiction operation budget by 30 percent causing a loss of 6,000 
patrol hours or 25 percent of cutter presence in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific.219 The 
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commander of JIATF-S at the time, Rear Admiral Charles Mitchel estimated that an 
additional 35 MT would avoid interdiction in 2013 as a result of sequestration. He also 
claimed that he was only able to stop about 20 percent of estimated traffic.220 The results 
of sequestration were not quite so dramatic: the difference between 2012 and 2013 cocaine 
“removals” only amounts to 18.6 MT.221 Sequestration showed the practical limits of the 
USCG which was operating multiple, aging medium endurance cutters.222 A diminished 
maritime presence resulted in a brief return to the sea-based Caribbean vector. This 
reduction in U.S. unilateral strength directly led to a decrease in seizures. 
USCG and navy deployments to Central America and the Caribbean have clearly 
pushed cocaine traffickers around. However, data is not publicly available on force 
distribution, operating hours by region, and “removals” so it is hard to determine the exact 
impact of long-term deployment patterns. The insular nature of the USCG and the DoD 
limits the analytical potential of such an analysis. 
The essential limit on unilateral strength is the territory of another state. While the 
violation of territorial integrity was once a major component of U.S. policy, especially 
under the Reagan-Bush administration with the invasion of Panama, it has ceased to be a 
norm in the region. Since Panama, the USCG and DoD have stopped at the borders of the 
smaller regional states to request entry in pursuit. 
B. BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS: PARDON ME WHILE I ENFORCE 
YOUR LAWS 
A fascinating element of America’s relationship with the Caribbean Basin is 
dictated by the willingness of the region’s small independent states to cooperate. Always 
protective of their autonomy, these states tended to resist U.S. influence in the region. 
During the Cold War, the United States limited its regional security cooperation to the 
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sponsorship of anti-communist forces or the presence of the odd DEA field office. Under 
the Clinton administration the United States began to shift its security policy away from 
classical interventions, like the invasion of Panama, and toward a treaty framework for 
regional security. As part of the Global War on Terror, the second Bush administration 
began to supply torrents of security aid to regional partners. These aid programs and treaty 
structures undergird the multilateral approach to be adopted by the Obama administration. 
1. Certification and Bilateral Aid Programs 
The early U.S. bilateral approach to narcotrafficking relied on the concept of 
diplomatic browbeating known as Certification. U.S. State Department would “decertify” 
states, shame them, and deprive them of aid if they failed to take adequate action against 
traffickers and “Certify” states that were taking adequate steps to suppress trafficking. 
Eventually, it became clear that Certification was counterproductive and that many small 
Latin American and Caribbean states were on the brink of civil war and chronically 
unstable. The United States abandoned the Certification process in the early 2000s but not 
before using it to strongarm regional states into cooperation on Washington’s terms, 
extracting a series of bilateral maritime security agreements. 
The bilateral approach the United States brought to the countertrafficking arena 
relied heavily upon the Certification process. The 1996 INCSR maintained that 
counternarcotic action was a matter of political will, which was tied to corruption. The 
Certification process began during the Reagan administration and leveraged Section 409 
of the Foreign Assistance Act to predicate U.S. aid and U.S. approval of loans from major 
international banks on the client state’s compliance with U.S. will and the adequacy of their 
actions against narcotrafficking and production.223 U.S. government presence and the 
sponsorship of most of these international lending institutions made the threat of 
decertification particularly potent. The U.S. government was seeking to compel 
compliance with the cudgel of Certification and it is not clear that it really worked. The 
sheer unpopularity of the measure is apparent in the defiant tone of the 2000 INCSR which 
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stated “Though controversial, throughout its 15 year-existence the certification process has 
proved to be a powerful, if blunt, policy instrument for enhancing counternarcotics 
cooperation.”224 This procedure changed and softened in 2002 eventually becoming more 
palatable, removing restrictions on aid, and focusing directly on collaboration.225 The 
fundamental drawbacks of the Certification process are best demonstrated by the 
Colombian Case. 
From 1995 to 1998 the United States decertified Colombia, which resulted in a 
decline in interdictions and a spike in violence.226 This descent into violence and chaos 
allowed increased quantities of narcotics to transit toward the United States. Because of 
Colombian weakness, the U.S. government changed tactics and pursued Plan Colombia, a 
massive, security-centric aid package.227 The bolstering of Plan Colombia under President 
George W. Bush coupled with his administration’s decision to end the Certification process 
and pursue a bilateral, collaborative approach to countertrafficking. Roberto Zapeda and 
Jonathan Rosen, two scholars and editors of a text on cooperation in the region, accurately 
describe Plan Colombia as an example of a hegemon utilizing its bilateral strength while 
disregarding the potential of assistance from multinational institutions: “Plan Colombia 
demonstrates that the United States has often refused to work through international 
institutions and has set the agenda for the region.”228 However, this bilateral aid package 
would be followed by broader multilateral aid packages to Central America, and the 
Caribbean. The transition from a coercive bilateral relationship to a collaborative bilateral 
relationship marked the start of an evolution toward collaborative multilateralism that 
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would emerge under the Obama administration. Subsequent aid packages took regionally 
oriented approaches and coupled with concerted attempts to build cooperative relationships 
between states in the transit zone. This softer approach to regional interaction was preceded 
by the earlier emergence of the bilateral maritime security arrangement. 
2. Bilateral Maritime Security Agreements 
Bilateral maritime security arrangements predate most economic and security based 
bilateral aid programs. Some of these arrangements are quite extensive and intrusive. In 
Joseph Kramek lists possible elements of a model bilateral maritime security agreement 
as: “(1) Ship-boarding, (2) entry to investigate, (3) overflight, (4) shipriders, (5) pursuit, 
and (6) order to land.”229 These basic maritime security agreements essentially represent 
a template of options for states. Some states have adopted some of these measures, others 
all of them. Writing in 2000, Karmek also charted the emergence bilateral maritime 
agreements with the United States. He demonstrated that by the end of the 20th century 
most of the insular Caribbean had extensive collaborative maritime security arrangements 
with the United States. He also showed that Central America did not follow this same trend; 
in fact, the only extant bilateral maritime security arrangements in place in Central America 
in 2000 were the ship-rider agreement with Panama and a broader agreement with 
Belize.230 Most 29 of these bilateral maritime security relationships emerged during the 
second half of the Clinton administration.231 It is worth noting that cocaine smuggling 
began shifting from the Caribbean route to the Central American route around 1998–1999, 
possibly in response to the proliferation of these agreements.232 However, this trend 
continued into the Bush administration, and bilateral maritime security arrangements were 
reached with most of the Central American holdouts by the mid-2000s. For example, 
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Honduras and Nicaragua both entered bilateral maritime agreements in 2001.233 Therefore, 
it is possible that this change in the security environment started the shift in trafficking 
toward Central America, but it does not explain the persistence of the route when all states 
in the region have bilateral relationships with the United States. 
The importance of regional maritime agreements and bilateral maritime security 
arrangements plays out in the performance of the USCG. Vice Admiral Charles Ray stated 
that in FY2016, 59 percent of USCG interdictions relied upon “bilateral or operational 
procedure agreements.”234 One particularly striking case of the importance of U.S. 
bilateral influence is 2014’s Nicaraguan maritime seizures. The State Department notes a 
steadily decreasing rate of seizures by the Nicaraguan Navy from 6 MT annually to less 
than 3 MT annually by 2013 and 1.9 MT in 2014. This reduction is attributed to a reduction 
in U.S. counternarcotics assets and operational support in the littorals.235  
These U.S. bilateral relationship with the states of the region amounts to a vast 
practical expansion of U.S. jurisdiction. This undercutting of state sovereignty explains 
why the Central American states and Mexico have been hesitant to sign off on these 
agreements: they view these sweeping bilateral arrangements as corrosive to their 
independence and were essentially forced into these arrangements through threats of 
decertification.236 Currently, Mexico remains one of the only states in the region without 
a bilateral maritime security treaty with the United States.237 In a region where U.S. 
intervention casts a long shadow, it is no wonder that some Central American states delayed 
entry into these security pacts. Despite this reticence to relinquish sovereignty, bilateral 
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maritime security arrangements act as important subcomponents of the larger, multilateral 
security network that has developed in Central America and the Caribbean. 
C. THE MANY FACES OF MULTILATERALISM 
U.S. multilateralism has emerged haltingly and taken three essential forms: 
diplomatic multilateral agreements, multilateral aid programs, and multilateral security 
operation organizations. Each of these features of multilateralism has evolved over time 
and in response to regional developments and tend to interact with each other. However, 
multilateral approaches to countertrafficking and trafficking associated security problems 
took a central role during the Obama administration. 
1. Diplomatic Multilateralism: Budding Egalitarianism 
Although diplomacy achieved the modern global counternarcotics environment in 
1988 with the UN Drug Convention, regional agreements and cooperative treaties did not 
emerge until the mid-2000s. The biggest, regional multilateral agreement backed by the 
United States is the Caribbean Regional Agreement on Maritime Counternarcotics and 
includes Guatemala, Costa Rica, Belize, the Dominican Republic, and France.238 This 
treaty is set up like the earlier bilateral agreements and contains much of the same language 
regarding searches and boardings. Signed in 2005, this agreement is of limited utility as 
only Belize and Guatemala share a border, and they have standing territorial disputes that 
make cooperation difficult.239 However, the Agreement marks a shift in thinking away 
from the simple bilateral treaties discussed by Karmek and allowed major powers to render 
direct operational assistance to the region’s smaller states. 
The Obama administration continued the move toward multilateralism. In 2013 it 
announced the launch of the U.S.–Colombian Regional Security Plan. This plan would 
leverage the capabilities and training of Colombian armed forces throughout the region. It 
marked a shift in tone and methodology: “‘Colombia’s established and expanding expertise 
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and capacity for countering this threat and shared U.S. responsibility to address the demand 
for illicit narcotics.’”240 Involving the revitalized Colombian government in a near peer 
role as an exporter of knowledge and leader in regional cooperation marks a clear shift 
from the one-sided relationships of the 1980s and 1990s. It has arguably produced results 
as Colombia has become a noted security exporter. 
In a similar vein, the U.S. has pushed a “train the trainer” model with two of the 
region’s leading counter-narcotics states: Panama and Colombia. The 2017 INCSR notes 
that Panama has been exporting its border security expertise to its neighbors including 
Costa Rica, Belize, Guatemala, and Honduras.241 Building these military-military 
relationships provide the underpinnings for future regional JTFs or treaty based multilateral 
organizations. 
2. Financial Multilateralism: Underwriting Friendship 
While the provision of aid in the form of equipment, training, and advisors has been 
a staple of U.S. security policy since the Cold War, its importance diminished following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and only found rebirth under the Clinton administration. 
The first major aid program specifically for counternarcotics was Plan Colombia, which 
launched under President Clinton and expanded under President Bush. This program 
sought to rebuild Colombian state capacity on the theory that a robust Colombian 
government would be able to staunch the flow of narcotics. In practical terms, it caused an 
increase in narcotics interdiction with the Colombian government going from seizing only 
60MT in 1999 to 250MT by 2008.242 The Merida Initiative followed Plan Colombia and 
targeted Mexico and Central America for massive infusions military aid. Under President 
Obama, the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) placed Central 
America in its own program, in 2010 the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) 
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followed.243 Later iterations of these programs include institution building as a critical 
component of regional stabilization. 
CARSI and CBSI are regionally oriented, State Department-led security initiatives 
that provide aid to individual states but take a softer approach than the simple, militarized 
counternarcotics approaches of the 1990s and early 2000s. These programs focus explicitly 
on internal state stability, security, and development, but beyond this, they actively seek to 
promote interstate cooperation and coordination.244 These efforts to promote regional 
integration and cooperation followed several organic initiatives, SICA and the CARICOM 
security mechanisms.245 Although CBSI and CARSI continue to focus mostly on military 
aid, despite requests from the region for a focus on economic aid, the programs have 
correlated with an increase in interdictions, although not an increase in regional 
stability.246 The mixed results of these programs indicate a fundamental weakness in the 
security based approach to regional security. 
Long-term aid plans have also operated under SOUTHCOM, the USCG, and the 
Justice Department. These have mainly consisted of advise-and-assist missions, which 
include the training of elite counter-narcotics forces, the vetting of units and personnel, the 
provision of maintenance expertise, assistance in the establishment of court systems, the 
training of prosecutors, and the implementation of judicial reforms.247 In some cases, these 
direct training programs have multilateral results. For example, the Trained Commando in 
Maritime Interdiction and Counter Trafficking (CAIMAN) course, conducted by 
SOUTHCOM and the U.S. Navy Seals, involved Honduran, Salvadoran, and Nicaraguan 
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trainees.248 The course aims to create elite units for individual states but by training 
marines from different states, at the same time the United States helps build military-to-
military relationships and trust. Thus, the financial component of U.S. efforts in the region 
improves qualitative elements of regional partner states. 
3. Operational Multilateralism: The Hub and Spoke 
Multilateralism is not an entirely new feature of the U.S. approach to the War on 
Drugs; some of the longest running counternarcotics operations are multilateral operations 
led by the United States. An early U.S. multilateral effort to staunch the flow of narcotics 
into the United States occurred during the 1980s under the Reagan Administration. In the 
early 1980s the Caribbean was the preferred route for cocaine smugglers and existing 
marijuana smuggling routes led from South America and a variety of Caribbean states to 
the Bahamas and Florida. Under the leadership of Vice President George H. W. Bush, the 
U.S. began to invest in regional interdiction efforts. The first major inflection point, 
Operation Bahamas Turks and Caicos (OPBAT), remains in place today.249 OPBAT 
started in 1982 and involved the deployment of U.S. helicopters and law enforcement 
personnel to the Bahamas and the Turks and Caicos. It also involved additional support 
from British government.250 Whereas previous efforts to seize traffickers had been foiled 
by Bahamian territorial seas, OPBAT both granted U.S. forces explicit access to the many 
small islands and cays favored as hiding locations by drug smugglers and facilitated the 
transport of Bahamian law enforcement officers to conduct arrests. OPBAT is an 
experiment in the overbearing bilateral relationship and the broader multilateral 
relationship. OPBAT may have remained a relatively narrow operation because of the 
special nature of the U.S.–U.K. relationship and the continued dependency status of the 
Bahamas, the Turks, and the Caicos. It proved extremely effective but asking independent 
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states to sacrifice degree of sovereignty is fundamentally different than making a similar 
demand of an ally’s former dependencies and associated commonwealth states. 
Operational multilateralism reemerged as the predominant collaborative tool under 
the Obama administration. OPBAT remained in force and is largely effective but it was not 
mimicked in Central America until the 2012 implementation of Operation Martillo 
(Hammer). A multinational effort, Martillo resembles a hub-spoke operation, wherein the 
United States operates as an information collector and distributes cueing data to regional 
partners who are the spokes. Martillo receives external assistance from the Netherlands, 
Spain, France, and Canada. The operation also involves Belize, Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. Functionally, JIATF-S coordinates the efforts of these 
component states.251 Martillo’s goal is to increase littoral interdiction, forcing smugglers 
further into the Eastern Pacific and extending their time at sea, thus allowing additional 
interdiction by long range USCG and naval assets.252 Significantly, Martillo places JIATF-
S partner nation assets under JIATF-S’s tactical control, a previously unheard of sacrifice 
of sovereignty.253 The result has been the development of a counternarcotics network 
where a central processor coordinates and cues individual state security forces. 
Since its implementation in January of 2012, Martillo has succeeded in the capture 
of 693 MT of cocaine and 581 suspect vessels and aircraft.254 The success of this program, 
coupled with the implementation of CARSI and effects of sequestration is reflected in the 
slight push back to the Caribbean vector. In 2011 an estimated 95 percent of cocaine 
transited Central America; by 2013 this had shifted to 86 percent. This appears to have 
stabilized and in 2015 as 90 percent of cocaine transiting to the U.S. passed through Central 
America.255 However, it has successfully pushed cocaine smuggling further into the 
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Eastern Pacific. In 2016 an estimated 62 percent of U.S. bound cocaine transited west of 
the Galapagos, avoiding the states of Martillo and extending their time at sea and 
vulnerability to U.S. unilateral power.256 Figure 23 provides a graphic representation of 
cocaine flow in the context of Martillo. 
 
Figure 23.  Cocaine Movement in the Transit Zone. Source: DEA Colombian 
Cocaine Production Expansion Report.257  
In addition to operational security arrangements, the United States has attempted to 
promote regional intelligence sharing and cueing by promoting technological tools. In the 
insular Caribbean and Central America, cueing is an integrative process that involves data 
sharing. While individual states may maintain discreet security forces, a degree of data 
sharing does occur under the Cooperative Situational Information Integration System 
(CSII) and the Regional Domain Awareness (RDA) system, USSOUTHCOM organized 
data sharing systems. The system’s precursor, the Cooperating Nations Information 
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Exchange System (CNIES), had been in place since 1998.258 CNIES had functioned as a 
bilateral information sharing system centered on the United States.259 The newer RDA and 
CSII systems employ unclassified, Internet-based data sharing systems that allow 
participants to actively exchange track data and made it more accessible. The initial build 
out of CSII in 2013 utilized mostly U.S. data from the Tethered Aerostat Radar System, 
the Maritime Safety and Security Information System, and the Relocatable over the 
Horizon Radar (ROTHR).260 The first states to buy into this integrated system of 
information sharing were the states of the insular Caribbean, Guyana, and Belize.261 CSII 
and RDA are the technological enablers of the larger operational effort but rely on the 
strength and ability of individual states to function. However, in the absence of action and 
component state security capacity, this technology is essentially an exercise in futility. Yet, 
when coupled with competent component states, it can enable collaborative, operational 
action. CSII therefore underpins regional relationship and serves as a major technological 
component of hub-and-spoke multilateralism. 
Through operations like Martillo, agencies like JIATF-S, and technology like CSII, 
the United States has transformed its regional security policy from a complex network of 
bilateral relationships to a centralized coordinating network. To fill the role of the 
proverbial hub, SOUTHCOM employs JIATF-S to coordinate regional partners and the 
various U.S. federal agencies and departments. The bilateral format has been operating at 
various levels since the 1990s but the hub and spoke logic of Martillo and JIATF-S has 
helped to create a functional multilateral network overlaying the nearly the entire region. 
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D. FACILITATING REGIONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN CENTRAL 
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 
The important undercurrent behind these operational forms of multilateralism is 
that they encourage and build local inter-military relationships. CARSI, Operation 
Martillo, and CSII serve to create a cooperative environment between neighbors that is 
unlikely to exist otherwise. This impulse to build multilateral relationships has led the 
United States to promote and back sub-regional partnerships. In the Northern Triangle 
States of Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador, the United States has underwritten recent 
local collaborative border control JTFs. The first of these new organizations was JTF 
Maya-Chotri a joint Guatemalan-Honduran effort launched it 2015, it was followed by JTF 
Lenca-Sempul, a border control JTF between Honduras and El Salvador, and a third border 
arrangement, the Maya-Pipil Task Force between Guatemala and El Salvador. Finally, late 
2016 saw the formation of a Tri-National Anti-Gang Task Force that acts as a new umbrella 
JTF for Maya-Chotri, Lenca-Sempul, and Maya-Pipil.262 These sub-regional cooperative 
bodies are relatively new, and it is difficult to assess their potential efficacy, but if they 
persist and additional data becomes available, they may prove effective. 
E. CONCLUSIONS: COOPERATION AS A STAPLE OF 
COUNTERNARCOTICS OPERATIONS 
According to the UNODC World Drug Report, in 2015 global governments seized 
45–55 percent of all cocaine produced; in the 1980s law enforcement could only stop 20–
24 percent of global cocaine.263 Progress has been made and it has been made in South 
and Central America. The U.S. approach has changed and, over time, granted more 
autonomy to regional actors. This expansion of multilateralism has yielded concrete results. 
In FY2014, 56 percent of Martillo disruptions were the result of Latin American Partner 
participation and 37 percent of disruptions involved assistance from international partners 
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like the UK, Spain, or the Netherlands.264 Due to its success U.S. led and enabled 
operational multilateralism is likely to remain a staple of U.S. counternarcotics policy. 
Retreating from multilateralism into the old hegemonic approach may stifle cooperation 
with partner nations and result in the increased availability of international narcotics. As 
such policy makers and should continue to facilitate partner nation collaboration and 
capacity. 
The strength of the United States undergirds regional collaborative networks. It 
promotes and facilitates sub-regional cooperation while building partner nation interdiction 
capacity. In doing so, the United States has contributed substantially to the security of the 
region. Trafficker generated conflict is inherently driven by U.S. demand for narcotics, but 
U.S. security efforts have contributed substantially to regional efforts to beat back 
narcotraffickers 
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VI. CONCLUSION: BUILDING MARITIME SECURITY IN THE 
AMERICAS 
Capable states engaged in routine data sharing do a better job at catching smugglers 
than states that try to tackle the problem alone. As interstate cooperation and intelligence 
sharing have improved, interdiction rates have increased. The United States facilitates 
many of these intelligence-sharing operations and cueing mechanisms. Interstate 
coordination has clearly produced results while the impact of platform investment is, at 
best, questionable. Future policy makers must draw on these models of operational 
cooperation in the construction and facilitation of a Central American cooperative security 
framework. 
A. NAVAL POWER: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is difficult to assess the strength of a military. Qualitative assessments require 
knowledge of naval operations and the exercise of judgement, while quantitative analysis 
may neglect quality and platform capabilities. However, given what data can be gleaned, 
minor changes in naval power and platform density do not significantly impact interdiction 
efficacy. Logically, there must be an impact, but it may be undercut by a lack of political 
will or endemic corruption. Nowhere is this clearer than in the Mexican case: the modern 
Mexican navy is large and built to interdict illicit traffickers, but either due to endemic 
corruption or a lack of political will, it hardly seizes any cocaine. Conversely, a small, 
competent navy may push traffickers further out of its waters. Recent upticks in traffic 
around the Galapagos imply that Panamanian efforts have begun to push some traffickers 
away from their waters. 
Therefore, governments interested in improving the performance of their Maritime 
Security Forces should invest in force quality as opposed to force quantity. Vetting units, 
officers, and crews to prevent against corruption and ensure adequate interoperability is 
likely to yield better results than providing a regional navy with a couple small boats or 
even a small observation aircraft. Once quality professional personnel are in place and can 
talk to each other, governments can start providing regional allies with additional MSF 
 110 
platforms. Adding a ship may be a tangible way to build naval strength, but it is unlikely 
to produce real results when local navies and law enforcement agencies cannot coordinate 
or are lack a desire to enforce the law due to corruption. 
As the United States operates as single political, professional, entity, it could 
respond effectively to regional trafficking by deploying additional forces. The U.S. Navy 
and USGC already have coordinating and cueing mechanisms and assets and could reliably 
enforce security throughout the region. However, this would require the redeployment of 
U.S. assets from other global commitments. In the absence of an influx of USCG funding 
or the deployment of additional naval assets, the U.S. Navy must augment its existing 
forces with regional partners. This degree of integration and cooperation that may make 
real progress in the region. 
B. COOPERATION: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The states of the Insular Caribbean have concluded that it is in their interests to 
cooperate with each other, with the United States, and with other European Powers. 
Because of the resulting cooperative mechanisms, they are more likely to seize cocaine 
shipments than the states of Central America. Central America and Mexico have not 
implemented similar cooperative mechanisms and accordingly operate in a less secure 
environment. This causes traffickers to opt for an Eastern Pacific and Central American 
route over the more direct Caribbean route. 
There are many factors affecting a state’s willingness to share information with its 
neighbors. Historical animosities may hinder cooperation; Central America has long been 
plagued by interstate conflict in a manner not found in the Insular Caribbean, and the 
Mexican-United States relationship is deeply rooted in historical grievance and mistrust. 
The resulting void in security cooperation presents traffickers with exploitable routes to 
the United States. 
The governments of the Caribbean Basin and South America have a common 
enemy: the cartels. Historical grievances and ingrained mistrust aside, most governments 
can agree that illicit trafficking causes violence and destabilizes the region. When these 
states cooperate with their neighbors and share information they can better employ their 
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maritime security forces, capture smugglers, and deter cartels. Small states should seek 
deeper cooperation and routine coordination with their neighbors. The United States should 
continue to facilitate interstate cooperation, ideally through multilateral agreements with 
operational components like joint commands. The formation of the RSS was fostered by 
the United Kingdom, but CARICOM grew organically, and its continued effectiveness is 
partially underwritten by cooperation with the United States. The United States should 
continue to foster the fledgling Joint Task Forces that have emerged between Central 
American states and encourage their broader integration. Doing so requires the 
amelioration of historical and current interstate grievances. 
One of the major stumbling blocks to Central American cooperation appears to be 
the persistence of the Central American migrant issue. Caused by the drug war these 
migrants are fleeing north, seeking refuge from the chronic instability caused by 
narcotrafficking. Since this began the United States has pressured the Mexican government 
to pursue a hard line on Central American migrants transiting Mexican territory. The abuse 
of migrants at the hands of organized crime and corrupt officials has hindered the 
development of Mexico-Central American relations. Additionally, the abuse of Mexican 
immigrants in the United States undermines American soft power in Mexico and provides 
a political roadblock to further cooperation. Shifting toward a more humanitarian refugee 
and migrant policy may reduce some of these sticking points and smooth security relations. 
This recommendation should not be taken as promoting open borders but consistent, 
humane treatment. 
The other long-standing point of contention among the Central American republics 
is the persistence of interstate border disputes. These boundary disputes are responsible for 
wars and continuing interstate distrust. Resolving these old competing claims may help to 
minimize historical rivalries. Either by leveraging the OAS or acting as a direct mediator, 
the United States should play a role in finally resolving these issues, possibly by offering 
additional aid as an investment in future regional stability. States without competing 
territorial claims are more likely to cooperate and improve regional security. 
Once major impediments to cooperation are removed, the Obama administration’s 
multilateral approach to the region should continue as a model for future action. Building 
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cooperative links between the Central American states and Mexico may provide the region 
with a productive degree of security integration. However, given the questionable impact 
of additional arms and the necessity of local buy-in, U.S. efforts at capacity building are 
best oriented at qualitative force developments, including the use of intelligence to root out 
endemic corruption and the recruitment of vetted units. A force that is willing to cooperate 
because due to minimal trafficker penetration should be significantly more effective than 
a large, corrupt force. 
If deep political cooperation is not possible, the development of low level military 
and law enforcement cooperation may suffice. The U.S.–Cuba relationship is hardly built 
upon deep ties of friendship, but it has proven extremely effective. The productivity of the 
U.S.–Cuba relationship proves that states do not have to be friendly, just willing to 
cooperate and relatively resistant to narco-corruption. The presence of liaison officers at 
JIATF-S and the implementation use of information sharing systems helps, but these may 
not be enough. Ships and aircraft deploying to the region should strive to have personnel 
on board capable of conversing with partner nations on a tactical level. They should also 
have the authority to cue nearby partner assets directly. The CARSI and CBSI programs 
need to focus on constructing effective collaborative mechanisms and fostering 
reconciliation between sub-regional rivals because simply providing the region with arms 
is no longer enough. The region knows what it needs, adopting flexible aid programs aimed 
at building economic strength may help states minimize corruption, develop economic 
strength, and build popular support for the United States by building U.S. soft power 
reserves. 
C. LOOSE ENDS AND FUTURE STUDIES 
Counternarcotics is a complicated endeavor. Throughout this thesis there are a 
number of themes lurking on the fringes and avenues for future investigations. Corruption, 
trafficker studies, the influence of revolutionary zeal, Haiti, and extra-regional states all 
deserve additional attention. 
 113 
1. Corruption 
Although it is not directly addressed in this thesis, corruption lurks at its edges as 
an impediment to cooperation. It is difficult to ascertain and difficult to measure. Yet, in 
some cases, its impact is quite clear. Honduras’s relatively strong security apparatus is also 
chronically corrupt, the recent accusations about police complicity in narcotrafficking 
should surprise no one. Even though it has cooperative relationships with its neighbors and 
an average sized MSF it failed to seize any cocaine at all in 2016. So, while Honduras or 
Mexico may make the motions of cooperation, corruption may bar the effective 
implementation of counter-narcotics strategies and hinder security force responses to 
narcotraffickers. Research into the impact corruption has on interdiction efficacy and 
cooperation should be carried out as it could improve the operation of regional 
counternarcotics mechanisms. 
2. Trafficker Studies 
This thesis focused on the behavior of traffickers as effected by the state but does 
not contain much information from individual traffickers. As such, it infers behavior using 
numbers and government estimates. Future students of regional cocaine flows may wish to 
conduct a series of trafficker interviews. These studies should focus on route selection more 
than specific methodology. It would also provide a direct measure of how traffickers 
respond to state actions. 
3. Marxist Revolutionaries 
Having a Marxist revolution seems to be one of the best ways to deter traffickers. 
One of the great ironies of this study is the efficacy of U.S.–Cuban security cooperation 
and the subsequent reduction of the Cuban route despite overt political hostility. Similarly, 
Nicaragua remains one of the least trafficked states of the Central American isthmus and 
is noted for its cooperation with the United States and law enforcement competence. 
The revolutionary fervor of the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions both tie, in some 
part, to a deep disdain for the corruption and narcotics associated with the Batista and 
Samosa regimes. While these states both have some vulnerabilities to traffickers, like 
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Nicaragua’s sparsely populated Caribbean coast, they are willing to cooperate with their 
neighbors and even their former North American rivals. While policy differences may 
persist, these states share common cause with the United States and maintaining a 
cooperative relationship is clearly in the best interests of all parties. 
4. The Haitian Problem 
Haiti appears to lack even the semblance of a coast guard and was not assessed as 
part of this study. However, since the 2010 earthquake the main target of smugglers 
transiting Hispaniola has been the Dominican Republic. This may be due to a lack of 
infrastructure that has plagued Haiti since the earthquake. The implication is that even 
traffickers require basic government provided goods and services to function. Accordingly, 
as Haiti continues to recover, law enforcement would do well to monitor the flow of drugs 
through the country in conjunction with rebuilding efforts. It is not clear if Haiti’s 
membership in CARICOM will insulate it from future narcotics transshipment. Monitoring 
Haiti’s role as a transshipment state as the recovery progresses and measuring it against the 
Dominican Republic may provide analysts with another excellent comparative case study. 
5. Extra-Regional Powers 
The role of European powers in altering the flow of regional narcotics is not entirely 
clear. The United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands all deploy ships to the Caribbean 
in support of their remaining overseas dependencies. These European powers are not 
directly addressed by this thesis, but they represent professional navies that work in 
conjunction with JIATF-S. As such, an assessment of their performance in conjunction 
with the United States and regional powers needs to be conducted. Additionally, extra-
regional powers with no inherent interest in the region have become involved in security 
efforts: China and Russia both have extensive security operations in the region. Whether 
designed to directly challenge U.S. regional hegemony or simply to reduce global narcotics 
supplies, these relationships and their effect on regional security institutions warrants 
monitoring. 
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D. FINAL THOUGHTS ON THE POWER OF FRIENDSHIP 
Cocaine seizures are merely an indirect measurement of maritime security. The 
capture of cocaine or the deterrence of smugglers occurs when the state exercises control 
over its waters. Security in the maritime commons is difficult to enforce unilaterally but 
the United States does not have to act alone. Acting with the small states of Central 
America and the Insular Caribbean, it can improve state supremacy at sea and protect the 
shared interests of all. 
To this end, collaborative maritime law enforcement mechanisms allow regional 
partners to augment their forces with shared intelligence and cueing from their neighbors. 
The construction of regional security institutions and information sharing mechanisms 
helped to secure the Insular Caribbean and are helping to secure Central America. Some of 
these information-sharing mechanisms have been underwritten and supported by the 
United States. Ultimately, these relationships are more effective than simply adding ships 
to regional navies. However, cooperative security requires maintenance, diplomacy, and 
patience; when in place, these relationships can be highly effective. When states look past 
their political restrictions and take pragmatic action with their neighbors, regional security 
will benefit, and transnational criminal networks will suffer. 
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APPENDIX A. COCAINE SEIZURE DATA AND FLOW 
ESTIMATES 
Table 6. Data Sources for Cocaine Seizures and Flow Spreadsheets 
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APPENDIX B. CARIBBEAN NAVAL STRENGTH 
Table 7. Data Source for Supplemental Spreadsheet for Caribbean Naval 
Strength 
 Description Parameters Location 
1 
Jane’s Fighting 
Ships Survey From 
1990–2009 
Entry search for Antigua 
and Barbuda, the 
Bahamas, Barbados, 
Cuba, Dominica, the 
Dominican Republic, 
Grenada, Jamaica, St. 
Kitts and Nevis, St. 
Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Guyana, 
Surinam, and Haiti 
Jane’s Fighting Ships, edited by 
Richard Sharpe (1990-2000) and 
Stephen Saunders (2001-2009), 
UK, London: Janes Information 
Group 1990–2007, I.H.S. 
Markit, 2007–2009. 
2 Seas Around Us 
EEZ Entries for Antigua 
and Barbuda, the 
Bahamas, Barbados, 
Cuba, Dominica, the 
Dominican Republic, 
Grenada, Jamaica, St. 
Kitts and Nevis, St. 
Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Guyana, 






Entry search for Antigua 
and Barbuda, the 
Bahamas, Barbados, 
Cuba, Dominica, the 
Dominican Republic, 
Grenada, Jamaica, St. 
Kitts and Nevis, St. 
Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Guyana, 
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APPENDIX C. CENTRAL AMERICAN NAVAL STRENGTH 
Table 8. Data Source for Supplemental Spreadsheet for Central American 
Naval Strength 
 Description Parameters Location 
1 
Jane’s Fighting 
Ships Survey From 
1990–2009 
Entry search for 
Mexico, Belize, 






Jane’s Fighting Ships, edited by Richard 
Sharpe (1990-2000) and Stephen Saunders 
(2001-2009), UK, London: Janes 
Information Group 1990–2007, I.H.S. 
Markit, 2007–2009. 
2 Seas Around Us 
Entry search for 
Mexico, Belize, 










Entry search for 
Mexico, Belize, 
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SUPPLEMENTALS
A. SPREADSHEET OF COCAINE SEIZURES AND FLOW ESTIMATES 
This spreadsheet (Supplemental A) is sourced from Appendix A. It draws on data 
from the UNODC, INCSR, DEA, and ONDCP to track cocaine flow and government 
seizures.  
B. SPREADSHEET OF CARIBBEAN NAVAL STRENGTH 
This spreadsheet (Supplemental B) is sourced from Appendix B. It draws on data 
from Jane’s Fighting Ships; 1990–2009, categorizes platforms, and compares this data to 
geographic data to determine relative strength. 
C. SPREADSHEET OF CENTRAL AMERICAN NAVAL STRENGTH 
This spreadsheet (Supplemental C) is sourced from Appendix C and follows the 
same guidelines employed by the spreadsheet on Caribbean Naval Strength. 
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